Grantee Research Project Results
Final Report: Normative, Social, and Calculated Motivations for Compliance: Marine Facilities and Water Pollution
EPA Grant Number: R828825Title: Normative, Social, and Calculated Motivations for Compliance: Marine Facilities and Water Pollution
Investigators: May, Peter J.
Institution: University of Washington
EPA Project Officer: Packard, Benjamin H
Project Period: June 16, 2001 through June 15, 2004
Project Amount: $227,303
RFA: Corporate Environmental Performance and the Effectiveness of Government Interventions (2000) RFA Text | Recipients Lists
Research Category: Environmental Justice
Objective:
This research project examined decisions by marine facilities in California and Washington to address potential dangers to water quality. The central policy issues were how compliance and adoption of best practices can be improved. The research project objectives were to: (1) test key hypotheses about the role of different motivations in shaping compliance with environmental regulations and adoption of best practices.; (2) test key hypotheses on the influence of different regulatory enforcement approaches on compliance motivations; and (3) draw implications from these test results for improving compliance with environmental regulations and adoption of best practices.
The contrast between firms that are subject to traditional forms of regulation versus voluntary forms of regulation permits three broad avenues of analysis that were the subjects of this research. One area of analysis concerned the effects of each type of regulation on the actions that firms take to address water quality. A second area of analysis was how regulatory approaches affect motivations of firms to take action. The third area of analysis concerned the role of governmental entities and interest organizations in affecting actions to address water quality. Each avenue of research formed the basis for a separate research publication.
Summary/Accomplishments (Outputs/Outcomes):
Data and Methodology
The data for this research project addressed behaviors of operators of boatyards and of marinas in coastal and estuarine areas of California and Washington states. This choice of firms provided a contrast between a traditional regulatory approach involving point sources of pollution as applied to boatyards and a voluntary regulatory approach involving nonpoint sources as applied to marinas.
Traditional and voluntary approaches perhaps are best thought of as endpoints for an array of regulatory forms, rather than as the sole choices in regulatory approach. Stated differently, variants of the traditional approach can involve efforts to educate regulated entities about appropriate actions and can make available different forms of technical and financial assistance to facilitate compliance. There is always the possibility of legal action against those who contribute to specific harms under the voluntary approach. When pursued, these actions push the voluntary approach along the continuum toward that of traditional regulation. In the case of water pollution, harmful acts can be pursued through the broader water-quality provisions of federal and state water quality acts. In addition, the voluntary approach implicitly holds the threat of switching to traditional forms of regulation if harms are not addressed sufficiently. For these reasons, it perhaps is better to think of this type of voluntary regulation as quasi-voluntary.
Boatyards are working marine facilities for repair and maintenance of pleasure and smaller commercial vessels. These are fixed-point sources of pollution from boat haul-outs, hull pressure washing, sanding and painting, and repair operations. Boatyards are subject to mandatory regulations and permit requirements under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program as delegated to the states. Marinas are basins with slips for boats, usually defined as having ten or more slips, which may or may not provide fueling and other shore services. These have limited point sources (fueling and boat launching areas) and more extensive nonpoint sources of pollution relating to potential spills from boats of sewage, bilge, fuel, and cleaning materials. Marinas are not subject to regulatory requirements other than the broad prohibitions of federal and state water quality acts against impairing water quality. Instead, marinas are subject to voluntary approaches for which delegated authority states have encouraged adherence to best practices guidelines involving education efforts and limited funding.
Three types of data were collected for this research project. Interviews were conducted with enforcement officials from relevant regional offices in California (six offices) and Washington (two offices) to understand pertinent issues and characterize overall enforcement efforts. Interviews also were conducted with a variety of environmental groups and trade associations to understand their involvement in water quality issues. The main source of data was a mail survey of marine facilities in California and Washington. Listings of 281 marinas and 140 boatyards in coastal and estuarine areas in these two states were identified from various publications and governmental permit listings. Questionnaires were mailed in late January 2002 with two rounds of follow-up lasting into March 2002. Complete responses were received from 144 marinas (51% response rate) and from 61 boatyards (44% response rate) for an overall response rate of 49 percent. Table 1 shows general characteristics of boatyards and marinas for the survey.
Data collected from a preliminary phone contact with all facilities were used to gauge potential response biases. No statistically significant differences were found for marinas with respect to the number of slips or type of marina ownership, and none were found for boatyards with respect to the number of employees or type of boatyard ownership. Although this nonresponse assessment is limited in scope, it suggests that the mail survey responses were representative of a range of marinas and boatyards in the two states. The data were weighted to take into account differences in response rates between the two types of facilities and among different geographic regions. The weighting scheme established a stratification of boatyards and marinas in Washington, northern California, and southern California.
Table 1. Regulation of Marine Facilities
Actions Taken: Influence of Regulatory Approach
One question addressed by this research is whether the form of regulation influences the willingness of firms to take actions to address potential harms from water quality. The findings that address this question have been published in the Coastal Management Journal. The research for this topic addressed the effect of different regulatory approaches on actions that firms take to address potential harms to water quality.
Table 2 summarizes these findings. The key measure is the percentage of best management practices that are undertaken by each facility. These include installation of physical devices, use of appropriate equipment, restrictions on activities at the facility, and management practices that encourage appropriate actions by facility operators and boat owners. To compare actions by marinas and boatyards, the measure is standardized as the percentage of best practices undertaken.
The results show that those facilities that are regulated have higher mean levels of action than those facilities subject to voluntary action. The latter, however, have on average a relatively high level of voluntary action that is 81 percent of the level of those facilities subject to mandatory regulation.
Table 2. Actions to Address Water Quality
The willingness of marine facilities to address water quality is constrained by several factors. Complexity of rules hinders firm action, particularly among regulated firms. The cost of devices to address water quality is a capital constraint that affects the ability of facilities to address water quality issues. Firms often feel there is too much uncertainty regarding the impact of specific actions to address potential harms to water quality.
The factors that explain variation in best practices were considered with multivariate analyses that addressed differences in approach, types of assistance, social and group influences, firm capabilities, and constraints upon firms’ actions. The multivariate findings show that traditional regulation when coupled with facilitation is more effective in inducing actions to address harms than is the voluntary approach alone. The voluntary approach, however, encourages actions especially for marinas that are publicly owned. These findings suggest that voluntary approaches, such as those employed with marine facilities, cannot be written off as wholly ineffective.
Motivations to Act: Influence of Regulatory Approach
A second set of questions concerned firms’ motivations to address potential harms to water quality. What motivates firms to act? What role do regulatory approaches play in affecting motivations? The findings that address this set of questions are forthcoming in Public Administration Review. Understanding the motivations of firms to address potential harms is important for gauging the promise and limitations of different regulatory approaches. If firms are motivated by a sense of duty and by concerns about potential harms, the voluntary approach has promise. If these motivations are lacking, more coercive approaches may be necessary. Regulation and motivations, therefore, go hand-in-hand, and the form of regulation is predicated upon assumptions about willingness to act. The willingness to act is affected by the form of regulation. The basic issues for this research avenue are whether motivations and willingness to act are different under mandatory and voluntary approaches to regulation.
Two sets of motivations were considered in this avenue of research. One, deterrent fears, concerns the consequences of failing to address potential harms. Deterrent fears potentially are activated by enforcement actions and imposition of sanctions for those found to be noncompliant. A second set of motivations, duty to comply, is a sense of obligation to address a possible harm that is potentially activated by educational programs, technical assistance, and the influence of various interest groups.
Both the traditional and voluntary regulatory approaches employ various forms of assistance. Assistance is used, however, in different ways for the two approaches. Under the mandatory approach, assistance is a mechanism for facilitating compliance. Under the voluntary approach, assistance is a mechanism for both drawing attention to potential problems and for facilitating action. One would anticipate, therefore, that the mandatory approach activates a stronger sense of deterrent fears than does the voluntary approach.
Table 3 shows differences among firms in their motivations to address water quality. To maximize the contrast between those facilities that are subject to traditional regulation and those that are subject to voluntary forms, the data for this table and related analyses exclude boatyards without permits and marinas with permits. These findings show that deterrent fears and sense of duty to comply are relevant considerations for both types of facilities. The data further suggest that deterrent fears are activated more strongly by the mandatory approach, whereas the sense of duty to comply is comparable between the two approaches. The more interesting aspect of these findings about deterrent fears is the evidence of a notable percentage of unregulated facilities expressing deterrent fears. Most aspects of deterrent fears are higher for regulated facilities than for those that are subject to the voluntary approach. With the exception of regulated facilities’ sense of civic duty to report spills, majorities of marine facilities report various aspects of duty to comply as a strong motivation for their actions to address water quality.
Table 3. Motivations to Address Water Quality
Multivariate analyses were undertaken to explain variation in deterrent fears and sense of duty to comply. Three sets of findings emerged from those analyses. One set concerns the impact of different approaches on the actions that have been taken to address potential harms. Deterrence is enhanced by increased inspections, but it is not limited to one-on-one enforcement. Showcase actions add to increase deterrent fears. These put facilities on notice even when specific actions to address harms are not mandated.
Interest Group Influences
A third avenue for research is the influence of different groups on firms’ actions to address potential harms to water quality. This research is reported in the Coastal Management Journal and in a conference paper by Koski and May. Of particular interest are those firms subject to voluntary regulation and the potential role of nongovernmental groups in affecting their actions.
The influence of different groups in shaping voluntary decisions by marina operators to address water quality is shown in Table 4. As expected, state agencies that have responsibility for addressing nonpoint sources of water pollution have the highest degree of influence. Trade associations and environmental groups also are notable players. Because of the greater affinity of firms for trade associations than for environmental groups, the influence of the former is expected to be stronger than that of the latter. This expectation is borne out by the higher mean influence rating for trade groups and the larger percentage of trade groups rated as having a high degree of influence in affecting decisions by marina operators to address water quality.
Table 4. Group Influences on Actions to Address Water Quality
To understand these influences, we undertook multivariate analyses of variation in factors that affect the influence of environmental groups and trade associations. Two findings stand out from these analyses. One is that the desire of firms to seek out information about appropriate actions is greatly affected by the information environment. The search for information about appropriate actions is stimulated by efforts to reduce uncertainty, but that search is constrained by the difficulty of obtaining information.
A second key finding is that information seeking and the influence of interest groups are closely related to motivations for taking actions to address potential harms to water quality. Firms’ desires to enhance their reputation in the marketplace, to obtain awards, or simply to do the “right thing” lead to greater influence of environmental groups. These desires reflect positive motivations to act that are related to a sense of civic duty. It is noteworthy that environmental groups rather than trade associations are looked to as the primary source of external validation of these positive motivations. The willingness of firms to act is contingent, however, on the belief that others are doing their part. Trade associations are important in this regard because they serve as cue-givers that firms look to when gauging whether others are doing their part.
These findings provide a more positive assessment of the role of interest groups in regulatory policy implementation than the extant literature. Rather than acting to thwart policy implementation, the interest group influences that we identified are positive ones that help to facilitate voluntary actions. Not all interest groups, however, seek the same outcomes and not all firms are willing to voluntarily undertake actions to address potential harms.
Other Related Research
This U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) research project has benefited from synergy with two related research projects. An acknowledgement of support from EPA is provided in relevant publications from these related research projects. One is a National Science Foundation funded study of compliance with building code regulations that also included analyses of motivations for compliance. The second related study was a collaborative project with Professor Soeren Winter of the Danish National Social Research Institute addressing Danish farmers’ motivations for compliance with agro-environmental regulations. In addition, two masters’ essays and one Ph.D. thesis were completed by students who partially were supported with EPA funding.
Policy Implications of This Research
This research was fundamentally concerned with differences between traditional regulation and voluntary regulation. These are perhaps best thought of as endpoints for an array of regulatory forms, rather than as the sole choices in regulatory approach. Because the voluntary approach at least implicitly holds the threat of switching to traditional forms of regulation if harms are not addressed sufficiently, it is perhaps better to think of it as quasi-voluntary. This research shows that traditional regulation is better in general at fostering water quality actions than voluntary regulation. More noteworthy is the finding that voluntary regulation can be effective in motivating at least a minority of firms to take action. These findings suggest a greater need for attention to the interplay of regulatory arrangements and situations.
The situation for boatyard operators in California and Washington mirror more typical regulatory arrangements for which regulators and regulated entities operate at arms-length with very limited interaction. Enforcement typically rests on self-reporting of water-quality analyses with only occasional on-site inspections. Enforcement matters because fines are issued and sanctions for notable violations are publicized. Regulations serve a variety of functions in this context. Requiring permits is a powerful tool for bringing attention to potential problems. The conditions established with permits, moreover, are important in setting forth expectations as to what specifically constitutes the civic duty to comply. Yet, requiring permits is not sufficient to motivate action. Technical and financial assistance often is necessary for facilitating and directing actions to alleviate potential harms. These findings, therefore, confirm what is well known about the importance of building commitment and capacity to take action.
The situation for marina operators in California and Washington presents a challenge for fostering actions to protect water quality for which the potential sources of water pollution are widely distributed, the costs of facility-specific inspection are relatively high, and firms are uncertain about the efficacy of different actions. The willingness to take action largely rests on the good will and civic intent of marina facility operators and their tenants. Threats of stronger regulation or regulatory actions loom in the background for which showcase actions are important in underscoring this backdrop.
The central issue, however, is how to enhance the commitment to protect water quality. The challenge is to create a stronger sense of civic duty based on recognition that individual actions matter in the stewardship of the environment. This research shows that distrust of government and firms’ concerns that their actions have minimal effects on water quality act as drags on civic commitment. Facility operators are more willing to take action when they believe others are doing their part. Public recognition of facilities for their leadership, such as environmental stewardship awards, has a potentially useful role in enhancing civic commitment and shared obligations to protect water quality.
More generally, the findings of this research project point to the duality of deterrent fears and civic intentions as motivations to address potential environmental harms. Given the limitations of the quasi-voluntary approach, deterrence must serve at least as a backstop to this approach. Fostering deterrence, however, need not entail an elaborate enforcement regime because steps can be taken to instill a general deterrent effect. At the same time, fostering a greater collective sense of a need for action can enhance individual facilities’ sense of duty to address harms.
Journal Articles on this Report : 4 Displayed | Download in RIS Format
Other project views: | All 18 publications | 5 publications in selected types | All 5 journal articles |
---|
Type | Citation | ||
---|---|---|---|
|
May PJ. Marine facilities and water quality: regulatory versus voluntary approaches. Coastal Management 2003;31(4):297-317. |
R828825 (Final) |
Exit |
|
May PJ. Compliance motivations: affirmative and negative bases. Law and Society Review 2004;38(1):41-68. |
R828825 (Final) |
Exit |
|
May PJ. Compliance motivations:perspectives of farmers, homebuilders, and marine facilities. Law and Policy 2005;27(2):317-347. |
R828825 (Final) |
Exit Exit |
|
Winter SC, May PJ. Information, interests, and environmental regulation. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 2002;4(2):115-142. |
R828825 (2001) R828825 (2002) R828825 (Final) |
Exit Exit |
Supplemental Keywords:
water pollution, water quality, compliance, enforcement, voluntary regulation, regulation, point and nonpoint sources of water pollution, coastal marine facilities, public policy, social science, water, pollution prevention, economic, social, behavioral science research program, sustainable industry/business, corporate performance, California, CA, Washington, WA, environmental compliance determinants, incentives, marine facilities, motivators, statistical model, survey,, RFA, Economic, Social, & Behavioral Science Research Program, Scientific Discipline, Geographic Area, Sustainable Industry/Business, State, Corporate Performance, Economics and Business, Ecological Risk Assessment, Social Science, environmental performance, incentives, environmental compliance determinants, survey, Washington (WA), water pollution, California (CA), regulations, statistical model , corporate environmental behavior, motivatorsProgress and Final Reports:
Original AbstractThe perspectives, information and conclusions conveyed in research project abstracts, progress reports, final reports, journal abstracts and journal publications convey the viewpoints of the principal investigator and may not represent the views and policies of ORD and EPA. Conclusions drawn by the principal investigators have not been reviewed by the Agency.