

Estimating the Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports¹

Final Report

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Abstract

This update and reassessment of the oil import premium was motivated by renewed concern about energy security, and interest in policies to promote the reduction of gasoline use in the United States. To the extent that conservation or fuel-diversification reduces dependence on any one source, the financial and strategic risk of potential disruption in supply or spike in cost of that source is reduced. This reduction in risks improves energy security. Reduced oil imports would also provide sustained benefits over the long run even in undisrupted markets, by reducing global demand pressure and oil prices during what is expected to be an extended period of strong global demand growth, substantial OPEC market power and higher world oil prices. We consider projected oil market conditions over the next ten years, relying on official U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projections. A current estimate of the oil import premium is \$12.00 per barrel (in 2005 dollars), with a wide confidence interval (\$6.67 - \$17.95) to reflect many of the unresolved uncertainties. While this central value is above some estimates from the mid-1990s and early 2000s, it is well within the range of prior estimates up to 1993, many of which were made at times when oil market conditions were more similar to what is now anticipated. The essential message is that we may have passed through a brief period of comparatively greater energy security and lower dependence costs, but strong market and geopolitical forces have returned the societal costs of oil imports to greater prominence. An important note is that this premium estimate omits any costs for military programs, and the difficult-to-quantify foreign policy impact of oil import reliance.

I. Introduction

I.1 Background and Purpose

There is considerable interest in the highest U.S. policy circles with taking action to improve energy security.² There are active proposals to reduce oil consumption and displace oil with alternative and renewable fuels.³ This study investigates the energy security benefits of

²For example: "Keeping America competitive requires affordable energy. And here we have a serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world." (President G.W. Bush, State of the Union, Jan 2006). "Our dependence on oil creates a threat to America's national security, because it leaves us more vulnerable to hostile regimes, and to terrorists who could attack oil infrastructure," (President G.W. Bush, statement on CAFE and alternate fuel standards Monday, May 14, 2007, in the Rose Garden). The President's "Twenty in Ten" proposal (President G.W. Bush, State of the Union, 2007) has the goal of "strengthening energy security and addressing climate change by reducing gasoline use by 20% in ten years" (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2007/initiatives/energy.html>).

³ The U.S. has had sustained interest in alternative motor fuels, as codified in the Energy Policy Acts of 1992 and 2005, and AMFA, the Alternative Motor Fuel Act of 1988. In 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized a national renewable fuels program (more commonly known as the Renewable Fuel Standard, or RFS program).

reduced U.S. oil imports. A range of approaches have been developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for evaluating the social costs and energy security implications of oil use, and for evaluating policy measures that alter the U.S. consumption and imports of oil. To help estimate the energy security benefits of reducing oil imports, we updated and applied the method used in the 1997 report, *Oil Imports: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs*, by Leiby, Jones, Curlee and Lee.⁴ This approach estimates the marginal benefits to society, in dollars per barrel, of reducing oil U.S. imports.⁵ The “oil premium” approach emphasizes identifying those energy-security related costs which are *not* reflected in the market price of oil, *and* which are expected to change in response to an incremental change in the level of oil imports.

We acknowledge, as did others before, that oil security and dependence costs are not strictly a function of imports alone. Other attributes, such as the level of oil consumption, the oil intensity of the economy, and the flexibility of oil supply and demand are also important determinants of the societal economic costs of oil use. These points are well made by Toman in his comprehensive survey pieces on energy security (1993, 2002). To the extent that a reduction in oil imports is accompanied by a reduction (increase) in oil consumption, or by the introduction of technologies or fuel sources that increase (decrease) the short-run or long-run price-responsiveness of energy supply and demand, the incremental benefits to society would be greater (less) than estimated here.

I.2 Approach

This update and reassessment of the oil import premium is meant to help measure the energy security implications of new policies to promote the reduction of petroleum use in the United States. The oil import premium is an informative measure of long-standing interest, but is not intended to provide complete guidance on oil security policy. The oil premium is not a measure of the full social costs of oil imports, or the full magnitude of the oil dependence and security problem. Rather, it is a measure of the quantifiable per-barrel economic costs that the U.S. could avoid by a small-to-moderate reduction in oil imports. The premium does not estimate the value of introducing a radical new technology, which may entail a major shift in supply or demand curves, or a substantial change in the long-run or short-run flexibility of supply or demand. As estimated, it is most consistent with the benefits of contracting domestic demand or expanding domestic supply along the existing demand and supply curves through conventional market incentives.

It is also important to note that an estimated oil import premium of \$5, \$10, or \$20 per barrel does not mean that a tax or tariff of that magnitude is recommended as the best policy. Nor does it mean that the imposition of such a tax alone would completely solve the energy

⁴Leiby, Paul N., Donald W. Jones, T. Randall Curlee, and Russell Lee, *Oil Imports: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs*, ORNL-6851, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, November 1, 1997.

⁵This paper was cited and its results utilized in previous DOT/NHTSA rulemakings, including the 2006 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis of CAFE Reform for Light Trucks: US DOT, NHTSA, "Final Regulatory Impact Analysis: Corporate Average Fuel Economy and CAFE Reform for MY 2008-2011 Light Trucks," Office of Regulatory Analysis and Evaluation, National Center for Statistics and Analysis, March 2006.

security problem and eliminate the need for any other policy. The multifaceted nature of the costs measured by the import premium suggests pursuing a combination of policies targeting key aspects of the problem. Bohi and Montgomery (1981) compellingly made this point. Helpful policies would promote more competitive oil supply in the long-run and short-run by diminishing the profitability and power of cartelized oil supply. They would also reduce the economy's vulnerability to oil shocks by increasing short-run supply/demand flexibility, promoting supply-region stability, developing buffer stocks, and diminishing the economy's reliance on fuels with unstable supply.

Since publication of Leiby *et al.* 1997, changes in oil market conditions, both current and projected, suggest that the magnitude of the oil premium may have changed. Significant driving factors that were revised or reconsidered include: oil prices, current and anticipated levels of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production, U.S. import levels, potential OPEC behavior and responses, Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) levels, and disruption likelihoods. We apply the most recently available careful quantitative assessment of disruption likelihoods, from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 2005 workshop series,⁶ as well as other assessments. We also revisit the issue of the macroeconomic consequences of oil market disruptions and sustained higher oil prices. Using the oil premium calculation methodology, which combines short-run and long-run costs and benefits, and accounting for uncertainty in the key driving factors, we provide an updated range of estimates of the marginal energy security benefits of reducing U.S. oil imports.

As part of the development of these estimates, the draft report underwent a formal external peer review by an independent panel. Comments received addressed the basis of the estimates, focusing on the choice of market elasticities, OPEC behavior, and the potential magnitude of macroeconomic disruption effects. They also called for updating the base price and market conditions to newer official projections, suggested language revisions, and called for some explanatory sections. A summary of the peer review is available (EPA, Coe 2008). This report embodies modifications and responses to those comments. Some topics were left for further work, but as a consequence of these very helpful comments, the results have changed in the following ways. Base price and market projections were updated to conform to the U.S. EIA's 2007 *Annual Energy Outlook* (AEO). This increased the estimated premium modestly (~\$1.4/bbl). Supply and demand elasticities were reviewed, and the non-OPEC supply and demand elasticity ranges were updated and increased to levels consistent with many recent estimates, particularly Gately and Huntington 2002 (see the parameter summary Table A4, and the review of other elasticity estimates in Appendix A of this report). As a result, the net elasticity of import demand from non-U.S./non-OPEC regions approximately doubled from the value used in the 1997 study and the earlier draft of this study, in keeping with the recommendations of some reviewers. Larger elasticities imply a greater market flexibility and lower effect of U.S. imports on price, in this case decreasing the mean premium by \$3-\$4/bbl. A set of sensitivity cases was prepared, displayed in Table 4 of Section V. We used a slightly

⁶Energy Modeling Forum, Phillip C. Beccue and Hillard G. Huntington, 2005. "An Assessment of Oil Market Disruption Risks," FINAL REPORT, EMF SR 8, Stanford University, October 3.

wider range of supply elasticities to parameterize OPEC response, and also, in a sensitivity case, applied one leading candidate rule for OPEC strategic behavior (i.e., OPEC maintains its market share through time).

The magnitude of the macroeconomic effects of future oil disruptions remains a topic of active debate. However, to consider the possibility, suggested by some but not all reviewers, that the economy is becoming less sensitive to oil shocks, we applied a reduced Gross Domestic Product (GDP) elasticity range in the base case results (GDP elasticity ranging from -0.01 to \sim -0.05, rather than -0.01 to -0.08). The mean value is \sim -0.03, reduced from the mean value of approximately -0.05 used in the 1997 study, and the earlier draft. Finally, this report includes further delineation of the nature of some components of the import premium, particularly the nature of the disruption sub-components, and a more extended technical description of the estimation methodology in Appendix B and C.

I.3 Concerns About Oil Security

Concerns about oil security stem from three related problems: concentrated supply in a historically unstable region; the sustained exercise of market power by key oil exporters; and the continued (although perhaps diminished) vulnerability of the economy to episodic oil supply shocks and price spikes. Global oil reserves are concentrated in a volatile region of the world, with 60% of reserves in the Persian Gulf region. Partly as a consequence of this concentration of low cost reserves, OPEC producers are able to exercise market power, functioning as an imperfect (“clumsy”) cartel and at times maintaining oil prices well above estimated competitive levels. The strength and influence of this cartel grows and declines, largely in relation to cycles of growth in global import demand and OPEC market share (e.g., Gately 2001, 2004; Greene, Jones and Leiby 1998). Nonetheless, OPEC’s production or pricing decisions can impose sustained economic costs over many years and can exacerbate, or ameliorate, short-run supply shocks. In the face of short-run supply volatility most oil consuming nations have limited scope for flexibly adjusting their oil supply or demand. This is particularly true as oil demand becomes increasingly concentrated in the transportation sector (IEA 2005), given its low elasticity and early evidence that the demand for gasoline in the light duty vehicle sector is becoming increasingly inelastic (Hughes, Knittel and Sperling 2008; Small and Van Dender 2007:40-41).⁷ Uncertainty, rigidities, and adjustment costs lead to economic dislocation, particularly during sudden and disturbing oil supply disruptions (Hamilton 2003, 2005; Davis and Haltiwanger 1999, 1999a).

While evolving market institutions, declines in the energy intensity of the U.S. economy, and strategic oil stockpiling are expected to mitigate the costs of oil disruptions to the U.S. economy compared to situation in the 1970s and early 1980s, the problem of energy security has not been eliminated. Our approach accounts for the benefits of the SPR. The power of the other two proposed mitigating factors is less well established. As noted by many experts (e.g.

⁷This trend has been attributed in part to higher incomes making consumers less sensitive to fuel costs.

Hamilton 2005, National Academy of Sciences 2002:86), according to simple economic production theory the economic consequences of disruptions are *expected* to be related to the U.S. expenditure on oil relative to the GDP, and to decline as that oil factor-share declines. However, Hamilton observes that the historical experience does not conform to the simple factor-share argument. The drop in GDP following the five most notable oil supply disruptions since 1950 far exceeded the loss predicted by the oil factor share. This and other empirical tests lead Hamilton (2005:10), Huntington (2005) and Brown *et al.* (2005) to conclude that the relationship between oil price shocks and output is more subtle and complex than originally thought, with shocks working their way through the economy in many sectors by indirect channels that can be surprisingly powerful. For these reasons, we cannot be certain that the disruption component of the oil premium declines in direct proportion to oil share. Regardless of this issue, recent trends have been less favorable. The decline in oil value share has halted and reversed. The rising expenditure share for oil in U.S. GDP over the past few years alone calls into question the assertion that the impact of disruptions on the U.S. economy is uniformly declining. Furthermore, much higher oil prices and growing oil imports also suggest that the incremental effect of U.S. oil use on world oil price and U.S. import costs could be higher than in prior years.

I.4 Summary of Method

In order to estimate the energy security benefits of reduced U.S. oil use, we developed an approach for evaluating the social costs and energy security implications of oil imports. This approach can be used for evaluating policy measures that alter U.S. imports of oil. For estimating these energy security benefits, we updated and applied the same oil import security premium methodology used in the 1997 report *Oil Imports: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs*, by Leiby, Jones, Curlee and Lee.⁸ This paper was cited and its results utilized in previous DOT/NHTSA rulemakings, including the 2006 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis of CAFÉ Reform for Light Trucks.⁹ It was also cited in the NAS 2002 discussion of CAFÉ.¹⁰ The principal updates to the methodology applied for this analysis reflect the substantial changes in oil market conditions since 1997, as projected by the U.S. EIA for the period 2006-2015. The results here are based on the average oil market conditions over this period as projected by the U.S. Energy Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook 2007 (AEO2007) Base Case. These changes and their individual implications will be further described below. Foremost among them are substantially higher oil prices and higher U.S. oil consumption and imports than in previous projections. The net result is that the estimated oil import premium is greater than in the 1997 study (see Table 1 below).

⁸ Leiby, Paul N., Donald W. Jones, T. Randall Curlee, and Russell Lee, *Oil Imports: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs*, ORNL-6851, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, November 1, 1997.

⁹ U.S. DOT, NHTSA 2006. "Final Regulatory Impact Analysis: Corporate Average Fuel Economy and CAFE Reform for MY 2008-2011 Light Trucks," Office of Regulatory Analysis and Evaluation, National Center for Statistics and Analysis, March.

¹⁰ National Academy of Sciences 2002. *Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards*, Committee on the Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, National Research Council (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press).

Table 1: Summary Results		
Effect / Study	ORNL 1997 Report (2005\$/BBL)	ORNL 2007 Updated (2005\$/BBL)
Monopsony Component	\$2.64 (\$1.58 - \$3.69)	\$7.41 (\$2.77 - \$13.11)
Macroeconomic Disruption/ Adjustment Costs	\$1.06 (\$1.06 - \$2.11)	\$4.59 (\$2.10 - \$7.40)
Total Mid-point	\$3.69 (\$2.64-\$5.80)	\$12.00 (\$6.67 - \$17.95)
Results in 2005\$. Columns report mean estimate and ranges. In the case of the 1997 report, the ranges reflect the subjectively defined “narrowed range.” In the case of the new study, the ranges include 90% of results from the risk-analysis simulation.		

The approach estimates the incremental benefits to society, in dollars per barrel, of reducing U.S. imports.¹¹ This “oil import premium” approach identifies those energy-security related costs that are not reflected in the market price of oil, and that are expected to change in response to an incremental change in the level of oil imports. Omitted from this premium calculation are environmental costs and possible non-economic or unquantifiable effects, such as effects on foreign policy flexibility or military policy. Also omitted are any spillover-benefits that may accrue to U.S. allies and trading partners who are similarly reliant on oil, and who would benefit from a reduction in the level or volatility of world oil price. These are expected to be large.¹²

¹¹Technically, the oil premium is based on a “marginal” economic analysis (i.e. a differential analysis of the rate of change of costs per barrel change in imports). At times we use the term “incremental” in place of “marginal” here to avoid confusion with marginal in the more common sense of “fringe” or “close to the limit of acceptability.”

¹²Estimates of the oil import premium when counting marginal benefits for all of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are typically about 3 times as large as the premium estimated from the perspective of U.S. benefits alone (e.g., Kline 1981).

I.5 Changes Since the 1990s Analysis of Oil Import Premium

Since the 1997 publication of the Leiby *et al.* ORNL report, changes in oil market conditions, both current and projected, suggest that the magnitude of the oil import premium may have increased. Significant driving factors that have been considered in this new analysis are: oil prices; current and anticipated levels of OPEC production; U.S. import levels; the estimated responsiveness of regional oil demands and supplies; and the likelihoods of different-size disruptions in the oil market. In updating the analysis, we applied projections of market conditions from the U.S. EIA's 2007 Annual Energy Outlook and the most recently available careful quantitative assessment of disruption likelihoods from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum's 2005 workshop series, as well as other assessments. The changes in key market parameters are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 below.

Table 2: Evolving Oil Market Conditions and U.S. Oil Use			
	1997 Study Conditions	2006 Conditions	AEO2007 Base, avg. for 2006-2015
Oil Price (\$2005)	\$21.45	~\$56	\$50.99
U.S. Oil Imports	8.82	~12.3	12.56
U.S. Oil Demand	18.22	~21.0	22.19
OPEC Supply	28.4	33.9	34.43
U.S. GDP (\$2005)	\$8096	~\$12100	\$14573
Oil Share of GDP	1.76%	3.57%	2.83%
Evolving historical and projected oil market conditions influence the premium estimate. Note that all these parameters are positively related to the size of the import premium, to varying degrees. (Price is in \$/bbl; imports, demand and supply are in millions of bbl/day; and GDP is in \$billion per annum.)			

Table 3: Market and Parameter Changes Influencing Premium Estimate			
Condition (+ or – Indicates Directional Impact on Premium)	1997 Analysis	2007 Analysis	Percent Change Since 1997 Analysis*
U.S. Economy Larger (+)	8096	14573	+80%
Share of Oil in GDP (no net impact inferred)			
Value share (\$ oil/\$GDP)	1.76%	2.83%	Value share +61%
Physical share (BBL/\$1000 GDP)	0.82	0.56	Physical intensity -32%;
U.S. Oil Imports Higher (+)	8.82	12.56	+42%
World Oil Price Higher (+)	\$21.45	\$50.99	+138%
Estimated Ave. Annual Likelihood of Net Oil Supply Disruption > 3.0 MMBD (+)	4.2%	5.8%	~+37%
U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve Size Larger (-)	600	688	+15%
Long-run Responsiveness of non-U.S./non-OPEC Net Demand for Imports Greater (-)**	-0.88	-1.60	+83%

*The 1997 study relied on 1996 data. Percent changes compare the levels used in the 1997 study with the projected average level for the next 10 years, 2006-2015.

** This item reflects parameter revision as well as changed regional supply-demand balances. While the actual elasticity of final demand and oil supply in individual regions may have decreased over the last decade, we considered a modestly higher range for individual regions than those used in 1997 (based on a review of literature on oil demand elasticities and on reviewer comments). The quantity-weighted combination of demand and supply elasticities yields the elasticity of net import demand for the non-U.S./non-OPEC region.

One indication that the current oil market situation for the U.S. is different from that of the mid-1990s is provided by the level of U.S. expenditure on oil imports. Real U.S. expenditures on crude oil are exceeding historical highs, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1 Projections of U.S. oil expenditure as a share of GDP hover at the high levels observed in the late 1970's, even along the Midcase projection path *without* supply disruptions. (Sources: Data through 2005 from U.S. EIA, *Annual Energy Review* various editions, and *Annual Energy Outlook 2007* Midcase, for projections after 2005).

The average annual expenditure on oil projected over 2006-2015, the period of this study, is \$413 billion per year (2005\$), based on AEO2007.¹³

We also revisited the issue of the macroeconomic consequences of oil market disruptions and sustained higher oil prices. There is substantial variation among the estimates of the GDP loss from an oil price shock.¹⁴ Given the competing influences of a declining physical-intensity

¹³AEO2007 oil expenditure projections are \$358 billion per year for the low price case and \$513 billion per year for the low price case.

¹⁴The higher estimates emerge from a variety of recent time-series analyses of the historical data, focusing on those oil price events that are sudden and outside the range of price experience in the prior 4 to 12 quarters. The lower estimates are generally produced by simulations with large-scale structural econometric models, whose results are governed by whichever mechanisms for oil prices to affect the economy are embodied in the model structure.

of oil use in the economy (barrels per \$ GDP) and a rising value-intensity of oil use in the economy (\$ expended for oil per \$ GDP), it is unclear how to modify the oil-macro calculation, if at all. The net effect of these counter-influences on the oil price-elasticity of the GDP may or may not be zero. However, it is reasonable to assume that the resulting elasticity level remains within the relatively wide (-0.08 to -0.01) range currently used in the sensitivity analysis.¹⁵ Accordingly, the disruption costs were estimated in the same way as the previous 1997 study. That is, the key parameter “GDP elasticity” that relates percentage GDP loss to percentage price change during a shock, was varied parametrically in a sensitivity analysis over the same range of values (-0.01 to -0.08), encompassing the estimates of most oil-macroeconomic studies over the last decade. To account for the possibility that there has been a systematic reduction in the sensitivity of GDP to oil price shocks we also considered a case where GDP elasticity was varied over a lower range, (from -0.01 to -0.054), with a mean value of -0.032 (see Appendix A, Table A4).

When considering the potential economic impacts of future disruptions in this analysis, two factors were borne in mind.

- The projected base or *undisrupted* real oil expenditures are already at levels exceeding those of the highest previous disruptions. The projected oil expenditure as a share of GDP is comparable to the levels of the late 1970s, above all other historical times save during the peak years of the Iranian Revolution (1979) and Iran/Iraq War (1980). A hypothetical disruption which could double prices from this base level would put us in uncertain territory, certainly a market regime which oil consumers and firms would find very disturbing.
- The oil market disruptions are simulated based on event sequences posited by the Energy Modeling Forum led workshops (EMF/Beccue and Huntington 2006). The larger of these events are typically major geopolitical upheavals (revolutions and wars), the type of events that are thought to be most alarming to economic actors and to lead to greater uncertainty and dislocation in the economy. They are not to be confused with routine price volatility or comparatively gradual demand-driven price rises, which might be expected to have lesser macroeconomic effects.

Using the established oil import premium calculation methodology, which combines short-run and long-run costs and benefits, and accounting for uncertainty in the key driving factors, we developed an updated range of estimates of the incremental energy security benefits of reducing oil imports shown in Table 1.

In the process of developing these estimates, and in response to comments from the review panel, a set of alternative cases was developed.¹⁶ They considered: different sets of non-OPEC supply/demand elasticities; alternative ranges of OPEC response, either in terms of the simulated range of OPEC supply elasticity or using a OPEC strategic behavior rule that preserves OPEC

¹⁵This GDP elasticity summarizes the cumulative loss of GDP expected over 2 years as a fraction of one year's GDP for a sudden, unanticipated doubling of world oil prices.

¹⁶These cases evolved from the draft estimates developed for use in support of the 2006 Renewable Fuel Standard to the case presented here in Table 1.

market share; and a lower range of GDP losses in response to oil shocks (lower GDP elasticities with respect to oil price). These alternative cases are presented in Table 4 of Section V, Results.

II. The Oil Import Premium as a Measure of Energy Security Costs of Imports

II.1 The Issue of a Reference Point: Costs Relative to What?

When assessing the costs of oil imports, we must choose an appropriate reference point, that is, answer the question "costs relative to what?" Three possible reference points for comparison with the current levels of oil imports and consumption are: (1) hypothetical perfectly competitive oil market conditions; (2) optimal levels of imports given market imperfections; and (3) marginal (small incremental) changes in imports from the current level. Additional points of comparison might be conditions under the introduction of different technologies or alternative energy supply/demand systems, or other particular policies. These comparisons would give an estimate of the value of particular market or policy changes, and are a worthwhile focus of future work (see, e.g., Greene and Leiby 2006). However, since this study focuses on import levels and seeks a per-barrel estimate of social costs, we restrict our consideration to these first three reference points.

At one extreme, the costs of oil imports can be measured relative to the competitive ideal (e.g. Greene and Leiby 1993; Greene and Tishchishyna 2000). Such an idealized world would have competitive supply and demand, no unanticipated price shocks, and no unpriced environmental damages or other social costs. In other words, the per-barrel costs of oil could be compared to the costs that would exist in the absence of any market failures.¹⁷ Using the competitive ideal as a reference point would provide a general view of the magnitude of costs that we might wish to recover. This may be a useful guide for research and motivate the search for cost-effective solutions. It alone would offer only partial insight, however, on how much government can or should do about oil use or imports to avoid these costs. It would be a mistake to treat all costs beyond those of the competitive ideal as avoidable, since that would implicitly assume the existence of costless government actions that totally eliminate the market failures.

Secondly, the potential costs of oil imports may be defined in terms of the difference between the costs at the optimal (efficient) level and the current level of imports, recognizing that complete elimination of social costs is not cost effective, and that some government programs are already in place to respond to potential market failures. Since corrective action is not costless, the pragmatic issue is one of balancing the costs imposed by government intervention against the expected value of that intervention. For example, costs may be estimated relative to optimal U.S. policy regarding import levels (e.g., Broadman and Hogan 1986, 1988; Huntington 1993). The goal is to approach an efficient level of oil import costs, not to reduce those costs to zero. This optimal level is dependent on a host of conditions about the structure of the domestic and world oil markets, the vulnerability of the domestic and world oil markets to price shocks, and the relationship between oil markets and the macroeconomy. The efficient or optimal level of import costs may not be attainable with policies that are cost effective and pragmatically acceptable, but the concept has the merit of being a desirable reference point.

¹⁷Note that non-competitive oil supply in the face of unpriced environmental externalities would lead to offsetting effects (see, e.g. Huntington and Brown 2004).

A third comparison point is the cost that would be caused by a marginal (small incremental) change in oil imports from the current, or alternatively, from the optimal, level. A small incremental reduction in imports may not be an optimal or adequate goal, but it has the virtue of being an achievable reference point. The marginal reduction in social costs of a change in import levels also reveals the amount we should be willing to pay (per barrel) to achieve that modest change. Hence, marginal cost is a comparatively simple but useful guide for incremental policy, and is the measure analyzed in this paper.

II.2. Interpretation of the Marginal Premium Approach

The oil import premium estimates the marginal economic benefit to the United States of decreasing oil imports, beyond the market price of oil. However, it does not imply that the imposition of a comparable tariff or tax would be either the most efficient or a fully adequate policy to deal with the entire problem of oil dependence and security. Echoing the NAS discussion of the energy security benefits of vehicle fuel economy (NAS 2002:86), it also should be emphasized that:

“[the oil premium] includes neither the entire benefit to the United States of ‘solving’ the problem of noncompetitive pricing by the OPEC nations nor the entire benefit of increasing international stability in world oil markets (or, equivalently, the cost of not solving these problems). These problems cannot be solved completely by changing the amount of oil consumed in the United States.”

II.3. Prior Estimates of the Oil Import Premium

The oil import premium gained attention as a guiding concept for energy policy beginning in the late 1970s, around the time of the second and third major post-war oil shocks (Plummer 1981, Bohi and Montgomery 1981, EMF 1982). Stobough and Yergin (1979) focuses interest on the demand or monopsony premium with their widely read estimates of the “buying power wedge,” which they placed at a minimum value of \$25/bbl to as much as three times that level.

The works in Plummer (1981, 1981a) provided valuable discussion of many of the key issues related to the oil import premium as well as the analogous oil stockpiling premium. They also provide a range of premium estimates.

In a book-length treatise, Bohi and Montgomery (B&M, 1982) carefully detailed the theoretical foundations of the oil import premium and exposed, through their thoughtful analysis, many of the critical analytic relationships. Because of its early position in the literature, and its comprehensiveness, it is informative to consider that work in more detail. They argued for attention to rigorous efficiency (cost and benefit) considerations and for evaluating what policies might be appropriate in that context rather than paying undue attention to the level of oil imports *per se*. They clearly defined the components of the oil premium as the “demand” or monopsony-related component and the “security” or disruption-related component (B&M 1982:5), with the

premium measuring how those two cost components vary at the margin with the level of imports. In keeping with much of the early work that discussed the optimal oil import tariff as a measure of the oil import premium, B&M 1982 highlighted the manner in which the incidence and optimal size of an import tariff depend on the elasticity of U.S. import demand, the elasticity of net supply of imports to the U.S. and the level of U.S. imports.¹⁸ These same fundamental relationships drive our estimates of the monopsony premium component, since they determine the degree to which an import reduction would drive down world oil prices or be offset by supply and demand responses globally with little price change.

Relying on theoretical arguments, Bohi and Montgomery carefully pointed out the ways in which market behavior and interactions (involving oil exporters, consumers and firms) could reduce the social costs of imports below the level commonly estimated by “conventional” frameworks. While they noted possible indirect (secondary) repercussions and costs of the import-demand induced oil price increases beyond the direct “wealth transfers abroad” (examples offered relate to exchange rates, capital formation, income distribution, and productivity), B&M 1982 ruled these out as too speculative, and with possible offsetting considerations. Similarly, they argued on theoretical grounds that private agents can be expected to respond efficiently to the risks of oil market disruptions by balancing the marginal costs of protective action with their discounted expected cost of oil price increases. Possible protective actions cited include reduced oil use, investment in flexible capital or substitute fuel capability, and stockpiling oil or substitutes. While they observed that some argue private agents have less complete or less accurate information about disruptions than the government, and that there may be deficiencies in private precautionary planning, they reject these arguments in the absence of convincing empirical evidence. We note, however, that this standard of proof is not applied with uniformity to all their theoretical arguments for market efficiency.

Overall, Bohi and Montgomery rigorously scrutinized each argument for a cost that possibly provides a rationale for government intervention. In many cases, they conclude the argument melts away under the presumption of efficient market behavior, leaving only the most essential rationales remaining as sources of the oil import premium: the wealth transfer due to demand power in normal markets, the additional expected wealth transfer or demand component during disruptions stemming from higher imports, and any marginal effect of imports on “indirect macroeconomic costs” due to economy-wide dislocations and adjustments during oil shocks. Our study here generally comes to essentially the same conclusions, and relies on largely the same key components, which we estimate through an independent formal approach. Like Bohi and Montgomery, we recognize that economy-wide dislocations during shocks are more properly a function of oil consumption than imports. We also exclude most marginal disruption costs that are directly born by private oil-consumers and producers, and which may be anticipated and

¹⁸B&M1982 and others note that the oil import premium is not synonymous with “optimal tariff,” and does not necessarily call for a tariff of like magnitude, given the complexities of trade policy. Rather it is an estimate of the net benefits of reducing imports, guiding the amount that we might be willing to spend per barrel to do so. The premium arises from diverse phenomena, hence “no single instrument” should be expected to adequately address the separate reasons a premium exists. Multiple instruments may achieve the most efficient/least cost intervention.

addressed by private precautionary behavior. However, we agree with Parry and Darmstadter's (2004) assessment that "Most analysts believe that the full extent of market upheaval is *not* fully captured in firm behavior" (p.14, emphasis added), so we consider the possibility that some fraction of expected price shock increases is not internalized.

Despite their rigorous standards for inclusion in the premium and generally optimistic assumptions regarding market efficiency in the face of higher oil prices and disruptions, Bohi and Montgomery still offered what might now be viewed as moderately large estimates of some components of the oil import premium. They did not provide estimates of the disruption portion of the import premium. While they noted that "uncertainties... preclude an unambiguous conclusion about the magnitude of the premium," they concluded (in 1981) that the long-run monopsony premium probably lies below \$10/bbl (1980\$), or \$20.91/bbl in 2005\$. In their Appendix they provide a range of estimates of the optimal import tariff usually around \$8.08/bbl (1980\$), or \$16.90 in 2005\$.

Kline (1981) and the EMF (1982) reported on oil import premia calculated from a set of controlled experiments with nine different models of the world oil market. Unlike many analytic approaches that are essentially static estimates of the long-run oil premium, these multi-period models of interacting regional oil supplies and demands allowed the observation of a dynamic response to changing import levels or tariffs. The premium for each model was then calculated as the net present value of incremental benefit minus costs divided by the cumulative reduction in imports over the forecast horizon. One feature of this analysis is that the early years reflect a short-run premium and the later years trend toward the long-run premium. The 1981 EMF-6 model comparison yielded oil import premia in the range of \$10.66 to \$35.55/bbl (2005\$). The mean and median premium values for the nine models were \$23.33 and \$18.82/bbl respectively (2005\$). Two other insights revealed by this analysis were that the disruption premia were typically about 1/3 the size of the monopsony premia, and that premia counting spillover net benefits for all of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) were about 3 times the size of the U.S. premia (partly by construction).

Hogan (1982), and Broadman and Hogan (1986,1988) revised and extended the established analytical framework to calculate base and optimal oil import premia with a more detailed accounting of macroeconomic effects (building on the macroeconomic framework of Nordhaus 1980). The method explicitly includes indirect costs from balance of payments adjustments and inflationary effects (for a summary, see Leiby *et al.* 1997:22-24). Extending Hogan (1981), they determined the exchange rate variation necessary to restore the trade balance after an incremental increase in imports occurs and an assumed fraction of the increase in oil import payments is recycled. They also accounted for the impact of SPR policy on the security component of the premium. Based on probabilistic simulations, Hogan and Broadman (1988:11 Table 2) reported two ranges of oil import premium, for two possible future reference price paths. The median of the two ranges are \$14.52 and \$17.52/bbl (2005\$). The 50% confidence intervals they provide (i.e. values from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile) are roughly +/- \$3/bbl.

The Broadman and Hogan results are unusual in their more equal contributions of the monopsony and security components than prior studies. Their results also highlight the offsetting interactions between the oil demand component and the security component of the *optimal* premium. The optimal premia indicate the societally-efficient level of marginal cost to reduce imports. It is generally the case that including policy actions (particularly taxes or tariffs) that respond to a larger value of one component would reduce the optimal level of marginal expenditure to address the other component. Bohi and Montgomery (1981) also noted that conditions and assumptions implying a larger security premium can imply some degree of reduction of the optimal monopsony premium.

Broadman (1986) revisited the analytics of the oil import premium, offering a typology that subdivides the monopsony and security components into direct and indirect parts. He also summarizes a range of oil import premium estimates available prior to 1986 (Table 1, p. 247). Including the high and low estimates for multiple studies from 1979 to 1982, the range is quite large (\$3/bbl to over \$150/bbl in 2005\$, mean \$39, median ~\$18). About half of Broadman's observations were from the EMF 1982 study.

A decade after the Energy Modeling Forum's 1981-2 study of world oil models (EMF-6), in 1991 EMF examined another, mostly different, set of models focusing on oil demand and the prospects for oil demand reduction (EMF 1992, the EMF-11 study). While this study did not explicitly conduct experiments to elicit the import premium, Huntington (1993) established a method to roughly infer their values from controlled oil price-path cases. Again, the premia were estimated from a per-barrel average of the discounted multi-year dynamic responses. Huntington imputes values for the oil import premium with a range of \$11.79 to \$21.32/bbl (2005\$), excluding an outlier value of \$53.66. The mean and median premium values for the six EMF-11 models were \$16.38 and \$16.21/bbl respectively (2005\$).

Leiby, Jones, Curlee and Lee (1997) provided an extended review of the literature and issues regarding the estimation of the premium to date. They also estimated a widely inclusive range of oil import premium values, showing the variation of each component with key driving factors such as OPEC behavior, the likelihood of disruptions, and the extent to which those disruptions induce external shock effects. The analytical framework used is derived from Broadman and Hogan (1988), but Leiby *et al.* omitted the explicit indirect costs for balance of payments and inflationary effects as less-well established empirically or theoretically than other costs. They used a single measure of macroeconomic dislocation costs during disruptions parameterized by empirical studies. The Leiby *et al.* estimates were based on 1994 oil market conditions, a period of markedly lower prices, comparative stability, and excess supply capacity. Under these conditions, a widely inclusive range of premia extended from \$0 to \$12.67 (2005\$). Excluding the case of no OPEC market power and essentially no costly disruptions, but assuming fairly responsive OPEC supply, a narrowed range of roughly \$2.70 to \$5.88 was also constructed.

Parry and Darmstadter (2004) recently provided an overview of work on the oil import premium. Based on a review of prior estimates, they offered their summary judgement: "...we put our best assessment of the quantifiable component of the oil premium at \$5/bbl, with a wide range

of \$0 to \$14 to account for the diversity of opinion among analysts.” (p. 14, assumed to be in 2003\$). Note, however, that while this summary assessment was published in 2004, it makes reference to data only through 2001, observing “since the mid-1980s prices have fluctuated between \$12 and \$25 per barrel.” (p.3).

As mentioned, this paper essentially updates the oil premium estimates of Leiby *et al.* 1997 with revised EIA projections of oil market conditions and some revision of oil market parameters (elasticities) to reflect further research. We also perform a probabilistic risk analysis (following Broadman and Hogan 1986, 1988, and the recommendations of Toman, 1993:1213) to generate a range of potential premium values. The extreme (optimistic) cases of *no* exercise of cartel power and *zero* probability of future disruptions that induce external costs on society are omitted as unrealistic and unhelpful in the current oil market and policy environment.

III. Cost Components

The full economic cost of importing petroleum into the United States is often defined to include three components in addition to the purchase price of petroleum itself. These are: (1) higher costs for oil imports resulting from the effect of U.S. import demand on the world oil price and OPEC market power; (2) the risk of dislocations of the domestic economy and reductions in U.S. economic output caused by sudden disruptions in the supply of imported oil to the U.S.; and (3) costs of existing policies meant to enhance oil security. Possible examples of the third component are maintaining a U.S. military presence to secure imported oil supplies from unstable regions, and maintaining the SPR to cushion against resulting price increases. An important point is that the policy-relevance of *any* cost category stems from the degree to which it is generally not accounted-for in the market decisions of oil consumers or producers, and whether it can be changed by a particular policy measure under consideration. For this reason the oil security import premium analysis considers *only* the incremental changes in such unaccounted costs as the level of imports changes. To summarize, the premium components include only non-internalized, marginal costs.

The following discussion reviews the nature of each of these costs, assesses the degree to which they are likely to vary in response to changes in the level of oil imports, and provides empirical estimates of each component drawn from our studies and other recent research.

III.1 Demand Costs, or the Longer-Run Monopsony Effect

The first component of the full economic costs of importing petroleum follows from the effect of U.S. import demand on the long-run world oil price. Because the United States is a sufficiently large purchaser of foreign oil supplies, its purchases can affect the world oil price. This demand or “monopsony” power means that increases in U.S. petroleum demand can cause the world price of crude oil to rise, and conversely that reduced U.S. petroleum demand can reduce the world price of crude oil. Thus, one consequence of decreasing U.S. oil imports is the potential decrease in the price paid for all barrels of crude oil purchased by the United States. Purchase costs for both imported and domestically-produced petroleum decline, but the gain from lower domestic oil cost is offset by a loss of revenue for domestic producers, so it is omitted from the assessment of net U.S. social gains.¹⁹ A reduction of total purchase costs for the remaining oil imports, however, represents a net welfare gain for U.S. society: the imports are acquired for lower claim on the output (GDP) of the U.S. economy. The “monopsony” premium accounts for the incremental change in the total cost of petroleum imports, per barrel change in the level of imports.²⁰

The extent of U.S. monopsony power is determined by a complex set of factors including the relative importance of U.S. imports in the world oil market, OPEC behavior and the sensitivity of petroleum supply and demand by other participants in the international oil market to world oil price. The degree of current OPEC monopoly power has been subject to considerable debate, but appears to have increased somewhat since the mid-1990s as global oil demand has grown. The consensus appears to be that OPEC remains able to exercise some degree of control over the response of world oil supplies to variation in world oil prices, so that the world oil market does not behave competitively. Similarly, most evidence suggests that variation in U.S. demand for imported petroleum continues to exert some influence on world oil prices. The substantial

The demand or monopsony effect can be readily illustrated with an example. If the United States imports 10 million barrels per day at a world oil price of \$50 per barrel, its total daily bill for oil imports is \$500 million. If a decrease in U.S. imports to 9 million barrels per day causes the world oil price to drop to \$49 per barrel, the daily U.S. oil import bill drops to \$441 million (9 million barrels times \$49 per barrel). While the world oil price only declines \$1, the resulting decrease in oil purchase payments of \$59 million per day (\$500 million minus \$441 million) is equivalent to an incremental benefit of \$59 per barrel of oil imports reduced, or \$10 more than the newly-decreased world price of \$49 per barrel. This additional \$10 per barrel “import cost premium” represents the incremental external benefits to U.S. society as a whole for avoided import costs beyond the price paid for oil purchases. This additional benefit arises only to the extent that reduction in U.S. oil imports affects the world oil price.

¹⁹ Since there are no oil import limits or tariffs in place, and the domestic oil industry is generally competitive, at the margin payments for domestic oil are equal to the real domestic resource cost of producing that oil.

²⁰ Note that if reduced U.S. oil import demand lowers the long-run sustained price of oil by the U.S. exercise of monopsony power, not only will U.S. import costs decline, implying a diminished foreign claim on U.S. GDP, but long run aggregate economic output will also increase. This (perhaps small) gain in long-run natural economic output (potential GDP) represents a benefit to import reduction. However, absent other market imperfections or policy interventions, the *marginal* change in potential GDP will be equivalent to the marginal benefit of oil demand, and equal to the domestic price of oil. Thus it is captured in the marginal premium calculation.

price increases seen over the past few years with expanding global demand also suggest a comparable decline in prices could be achieved, should demand growth slow or demand decline.

The key determinants of the magnitude of the monopsony premium are the strength of influence of U.S. import demand levels on world oil price and the magnitude of U.S. imports (which are subject to the prospective price change). The change in world oil price depends on the response of OPEC, and the collective response of competitive oil producers and consumers in the rest of the world. The response of OPEC countries to the exercise of countervailing market power by a major consumer such as the United States is a problem of bilateral monopoly, and essentially indeterminate. However, the problem can be bounded and the assessment can be guided by consideration of what is in OPEC's own long-term self interest.

The practical responses to a U.S. import reduction could range from OPEC's complete defense of market volume to a complete defense of price. The former case would entail absolute supply inflexibility, with OPEC maintaining output level unchanged and letting price slide until all other regions accommodate the market change. The latter case would require unlimited supply flexibility, with OPEC contracting output to fully offset U.S. import reduction.²¹ These polar alternatives correspond to an OPEC supply "elasticity" (the percentage change in supply for a percentage change in price) of zero and infinity respectively. In keeping with the 1997 study we bound the range of outcomes with OPEC supply response elasticities in a somewhat narrower range, in this case from -0.25 to -6.0, and the implied monopsony premium for that range of values is calculated.

The net price-responsiveness of the producing and consuming regions other than the United States and OPEC was reconsidered²² and constructed from separate elasticity ranges for crude oil supply and demand, weighted by the projected supply and demand quantities for that region. While the parameters are treated as uncertain, the resulting sample median elasticity for non-U.S./non-OPEC import demand was -1.60, approximately double the value used in the 1997 ORNL study.

The total change in world oil price is determined based on combined response of OPEC supply and the net demand for imports by the rest of the world outside of the United States. Together, the net response of the two regions is far more elastic than the response of either region alone. This is because they respond oppositely to price, OPEC being a supplier and the non-U.S./non-OPEC region being a net importer. As a result of the random sampling process in the simulations executed and the combined response of OPEC supply and non-U.S./non-OPEC import demand, the net elasticity of import supply facing the U.S. varied from 4.3 to 18.0 (90%

²¹ Conceivably, there is a more extreme OPEC response, which is to punitively reduce supply by more than the amount of demand reduction to drive prices even higher. Such a strategy is unlikely to be successfully maintained in the long run given competitive oil supply regions, and is particularly unlikely in the projected situation for the next 10 years where prices are high and OPEC is anticipated to already be exercising substantial production restraint. Note that if OPEC defends market share to some degree and lets price fall, the framework used here captures benefits to the United States in the monopsony premium. However, if OPEC instead defends price and sacrifices output and market share, it will necessarily have diminished long-run cartel pricing power (e.g. Greene 1991, Greene, Jones and Leiby 1998:59). The method here does not yet include the likely benefits to the U.S. from the diminishment of OPEC power that comes with its declining share, or any benefits during disruptions from increased slack oil production capacity in OPEC countries if their pre-disruption output is contracted.

²² We are thankful for reviewer comments pointing out this need.

confidence range).²³ Alternatively stated, the resulting net response of world oil price to a hypothetical one-million barrel per day (1 MMBD) U.S. import demand reduction varied from \$0.25/bbl to \$1.31/bbl, with a mean value of \$0.71/barrel.

Arguably, an explicitly strategic representation of OPEC behavior might be preferable to the purely parametric treatment of OPEC supply response described above. The response of OPEC supply to a U.S. demand reduction could possibly be modeled formally with game theory, and has been, to some degree.²⁴ Recognizing the limits of our understanding of OPEC's strategic behavioral incentives, and the marked complexity of accounting for competing objectives of OPEC subgroups and dynamic tradeoffs in the short-run and long-run, we set aside such an approach for possible future consideration. So we chose a parametric approach for the bulk of the analysis. However, we also considered one representation of OPEC strategic self-interested behavior, following Gately (2004, 2007), specifically OPEC maintenance of market *share*.

Using a market simulation model, Gately (2004) compared payoffs to OPEC for faster and slower output growth under a variety of OPEC (and OPEC subgroup) behavioral assumptions and under uncertainty regarding the market's underlying parameter values. He found that aggressive output expansion often yielded lower payoffs than maintaining market share. Gately (2007) further studied various OPEC export strategies and their implications for OPEC profits. He sought a "robustly optimal strategy" for OPEC that served its interests, performing well over the wide range of possible market conditions and given the "unavoidable uncertainties that underlie the world oil market." He concluded that for the range of cases examined, the constant export-share strategy yielded the highest possible discounted profits for OPEC, and that it performed robustly compared to other strategies for reasonable changes in parameters.²⁵ Based on these results we consider the Constant Market Share strategy for OPEC as one possible representation of strategic behavior, and as an alternative to the parametric variation of OPEC supply elasticity used in most of our simulations of the premium value. This is an intermediate behavioral strategy between strict price maintenance and strict output maintenance. It proves equivalent to OPEC suppliers matching the elasticity of non-U.S./non-OPEC supply regions. Consequently, it is comparable to OPEC operating with a fairly low supply elasticity, and this strategy leads to greater monopsony effects and higher monopsony premia. Incidentally, this general OPEC

²³These statistics pertain to the primary case presented here, that in Table 1. Somewhat different values were observed for the various sensitivity cases.

²⁴Some of the review panel suggested investigating this approach. Others were more skeptical about whether a game-theoretical approach would be practical, improve the realism of the representation, or add further insight. The substantial challenges of applying game theory include characterizing the objectives of OPEC and its subgroups and selecting an appropriate equilibrium concept for the interactions among OPEC subgroups, non-OPEC suppliers, and large oil consuming countries exercising countervailing monopsony power. As Karp and Newbery (1991) observe, the representation needs to account for resource exhaustibility, the market power of larger suppliers, and the market power of the large oil importers. The behavior of OPEC and its cartel structure have been widely studied with some success (e.g. Griffin 1985, Gulen 1996, Alhajji and Huettner 2000, Smith 2006 and Kaufmann *et al.* 2008), but typically yielding only weakly descriptive models. The value of game theory is explicitly reviewed by Griffin and Neilsen (1994), and revisited more recently in Griffin and Xiong (1997). Many of the approaches seek a Nash-Cournot equilibrium among open-loop intertemporal production plans (e.g. recently Yang 2007), but Newbery (1981), Ulph and Folie (1981) and Karp and Newbery (1991) have emphasized that many open-loop strategies are unavoidably time inconsistent. While theoretical models have been developed and yield insights, the high degree of parameter uncertainty (regarding market elasticities, resource bases, etc.) can overwhelm the descriptive power of such approaches. Given these challenges, we defer the exploration of game theory, such as Karp and Newbery's OPEC-large-importer strategic framework, for possible later contributions to the premium calculation.

²⁵However in some cases its advantage over other strategies was modest.

behavioral strategy of preserving market share is also consistent with the EIA's current thinking, at least for its AEO2007 reference case:

"The reference case represents EIA's current judgment regarding the expected behavior of OPEC producers in the long term, adjusting production to keep world oil prices in a range of \$50 to \$60 per barrel, in keeping with OPEC's stated goal of *keeping potential competitors from eroding its market share.*" (emphasis added, U.S. EIA 2007)

III.2 Disruption Costs

The second component of the oil import premium, the "disruption premium," arises from the effect of oil imports on the expected cost of disruptions. A sudden increase in oil prices triggered by a disruption in world oil supplies has two main effects: it increases the costs of imports in the short run, further expanding the transfer of U.S. wealth to foreign producers; and it can lead to macroeconomic contraction, dislocation, and GDP loss. As in all parts of this import premium analysis, we will focus attention on estimating how these disruption costs change with the level of pre-disruption imports.

III.2.1 Disruption: Higher Costs of Oil Imports and Wealth Transfer During Shocks

During oil price shocks, the higher price of imported oil causes increased payments for imports and an acceleration of the transfer of wealth from U.S. society to oil exporters. This increased claim on U.S. economic output is a welfare loss to the United States that is separate from and additional to any reduction in economic output due to the shock. For some disruptions (wars or revolutions) a portion of this increased import cost may also reflect the opportunistic extension, or simply maintenance, of cartel supplier power in the face of reduced supply. In the case of other disruptions, such as supply embargoes, strikes, and economic disputes, the bulk of price increase may be attributable to market power. Regardless of cause, we count the increased wealth transfer during shocks as a welfare loss to the degree that the expected price increase is not anticipated and internalized by oil consumers.

III.2.2 Disruption Macroeconomic Costs: Potential Output Loss and Dislocation/Adjustment Costs

Macroeconomic losses during price shocks reflect aggregate output losses and allocative losses.²⁶ The former are reductions in the level of output that the U.S. economy can produce when using fully its available resources; the latter stem from temporary dislocation and underutilization of available resources due to the shock, such as labor unemployment and idle plant capacity. The aggregate output effect, a reduction in “potential” economic output, will last so long as the price is elevated. It depends on the extent and duration of any disruption in the world supply of oil, since these factors determine the magnitude of the resulting increase in prices for petroleum products, as well as whether and how rapidly these prices return to their pre-disruption levels.

In addition to the aggregate contraction, there appear to be “allocative” or “adjustment” costs associated with dislocated energy markets. Because supply disruptions and resulting price increases occur suddenly and often involve disturbing news of war or strife, empirical evidence shows they also impose additional costs on businesses and households that must adjust their use of petroleum and other productive factors more rapidly than if the same price increase had occurred gradually (e.g. Hamilton 2005, Davis and Haltiwanger 1999, 1999a).²⁷ Dislocational effects include the unemployment of workers and other resources during the time needed for their intersectoral or interregional reallocation, and pauses in capital investment due to uncertainty. These adjustments temporarily reduce the level of economic output that can be achieved even below the “potential” output level that would ultimately be reached once the economy’s adaptation to higher petroleum prices is complete. The additional costs imposed on businesses and households for making these adjustments reflect their limited ability to adjust prices, output levels, and their use of energy, labor, and other inputs quickly and smoothly in response to rapid changes in prices for petroleum products.

While it is widely expected that the macroeconomic costs of oil shocks will decline with declining share of oil in the economy, so far efforts to demonstrate this from the statistical record have yielded inconclusive results (e.g. Huntington 2004, Brown, Fu and Yücel 2005). Furthermore, as mentioned above, while the physical intensity of oil use in the economy has declined by 32% over the last decade, the *value* share of oil in the economy has increased by over 60%. For these reasons there is no certain argument for estimating the macroeconomic impacts of price shocks in this study with a different range of parameters from that used in the 1997 study. Nonetheless, to avoid overestimation and to account for the possibility that future oil shocks may have lower macroeconomic impacts than the full range of historically-based parameter estimates implies, we considered a somewhat lower range of GDP impacts (per unit price change) in the primary case. The original 1997 study range is included as a sensitivity case.

²⁶For recent surveys of the literature on oil prices and the macroeconomy, see Brown and Yücel (2002), Jones, Leiby and Paik (2004), and Hamilton (2005).

²⁷Davis, Stephen and John Haltiwanger 1999. “Sectoral Job Creation and Destruction in Response to Oil Price Changes,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper W7095. Hamilton, James D. 2005. “Oil and the Macroeconomy,” Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.

III.2.3 Disruption Premium is the Marginal Change in Expected Disruption Costs

Since future disruptions in foreign oil supplies are an uncertain prospect, each of the disruption cost components must be weighted by the probability that the supply of petroleum to the United States will actually be disrupted. Thus, the “expected value” of these costs – the product of the probability that a supply disruption will occur and the sum of costs from reduced economic output and the economy’s abrupt adjustment to sharply higher petroleum prices -- is the relevant measure of their magnitude.²⁸ Further, when assessing the energy security value of a policy to reduce oil use, it is only the *change* in the expected costs of disruption that results from the policy that is relevant. In this study we estimate how the expected disruption costs may change from lowering the normal (pre-disruption) level of oil imports, from any induced alteration in the likelihood, size or cost of disruption.

While the total vulnerability of the U.S. economy to oil price shocks depends on both petroleum consumption *and* the level of U.S. oil imports, variation in imports alone may have some effect on the magnitude of the price increase resulting from any disruption of import supply. This could occur from the alteration of starting supply-demand balances and altering the short-run flexibility (elasticity) of petroleum use. In addition, changing the quantity of petroleum imported into the United States may also affect the probability or size of such a disruption. If the pre-disruption level of oil imports affects either the probability that oil import supply will be disrupted, the quantity of the supply loss, the size of the resulting price increase, or the cost of a given price increase, then the expected value of the costs stemming from supply disruptions will also vary in response to the level of oil imports. We express this formally in Section IV.4. Each possible channel of marginal impact is reflected in the premium calculation.

In summary, the steps needed to calculate the disruption or security premium are:

- First, determine the likelihood of an oil supply disruption in the future;
- Second, assess the likely impacts of a potential oil supply disruption on world oil price;
- Third, assess the impact of the oil price shock on the U.S. economy (in terms of import costs and macroeconomic losses); and
- Fourth, determine how these costs change with imports.

The expected value of price-spike cost avoided by reducing oil imports becomes the oil security portion of the premium.

III.2.4 Role of Market Mechanisms in Reducing Costs

When estimating the disruption component of the oil import premium we need to recognize the availability of market mechanisms that allow the U.S. economy to adjust to oil supply disruptions. A variety of market mechanisms – including oil futures markets, energy conservation measures, and some technologies that permit rapid fuel switching – are now available within the U.S. economy for businesses and households to anticipate and “insure”

²⁸Note that the use of the expected cost measure embodies an assumption of risk neutrality with respect to disruption risk. Risk aversion would imply larger premia.

themselves, to some extent, against the effects of petroleum price increases. In principle, by employing these mechanisms – for example, by investing in added energy conservation measures in anticipation of shocks, stockpiling oil, or installing technologies that can operate using multiple fuel sources – businesses and households can reduce their costs of adjusting to sudden increases in oil prices.

The availability of these mechanisms has undoubtedly reduced the potential costs to the U.S. economy that could be imposed by disruptions in the world supply of oil. But the degree to which markets anticipate and account for the long-run risk of price increases from strategic oil shocks is not known with much confidence. Nonetheless, the estimates reported here seek to explicitly account for futures markets and other anticipatory mechanisms. Private firms and individuals are described as anticipating a large fraction of disruption price increases, and the direct costs to them of those expected price increases are excluded from the premium.

However, the existence of private mechanisms like the futures market and energy conservation opportunities does not assure that the socially optimal level of protection of disruption risk is attained. The first and most important reason is that private markets do not automatically take into account the external and non-market consequences of producer and consumer choices. Even if consumers and firms are aware of and take advantage of measures to self-insure against disruptions, they can only be expected to protect themselves against the economic risks that they expect to bear directly (i.e., their own individual, private costs). The marginal private disruption risk per barrel of imports is equal to the expected oil price increase due to shocks. Beyond this, it is not plausible that individual firms or consumers account for their wider effects on the oil import costs of others in the market, on the magnitudes of prices changes, and on the macroeconomic activity in other sectors and regions, so the level of protection is necessarily sub-optimal.

Secondly, the scope for private anticipatory protection is limited. The futures market extends only a limited time into the future,²⁹ the private cost of long-term petroleum stockpiling by individual consumers or firms against strategic oil disruptions is prohibitive, and dual-fuel technology is only available and cost-effective in limited applications.³⁰ Recognizing that private agents use futures to hedge at most only their own private risk, not the social effects (risk) of their oil market actions, and that only a subset of economic actors participate directly in the futures market, this study implicitly accounts for futures and other possible precautionary behavior by assuming that private actors internalize some fraction of their private risk. That is, 0%, 25% or 100% of the expected oil price increase due to shocks is assumed to be accounted for in private behavior, and excluded from the social premium calculation.

²⁹The limited scope of the futures markets is highlighted by the observation that virtually all trading is short term in nature, with contract terms of under 18 months. Over the years 2001 to 2006, on average 43% of the volume of trading for NYMEX light sweet crude futures fell within the first month (spot) delivery, and 91% fell within 4 months delivery term. The futures markets for products (heating oil and unleaded gasoline) are even more heavily loaded toward the first three to four months than is the case for crude. Futures trading seems more attentive to short-run volatility, not strategic shock risk.

³⁰For example, dual and flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) (notably alcohol FFVs) are beginning to enter the fleet, but up to this point the fuel infrastructure is not widely available and many FFV owners are even unaware that their vehicles have the capability.

Consumers of petroleum products are unlikely to take into account the potential costs that a disruption in oil supplies imposes on other consumers and sectors of the U.S. economy, or the indirect effect of their investment, consumption, or import decisions on those wider disruption costs.

In sum, while the availability of private protective mechanisms has undoubtedly reduced the potential costs that could be imposed by disruptions in the world supply of oil, a substantial portion of these disruption costs is probably not reflected in the market price of petroleum or in the response of economic agents. There are two reasons. First, the availability of cost-effective mechanisms for private agents to avoid long-term risk is limited. Second, and more importantly, even if measures are available to self-insure against disruptions, consumers and firms can only be expected to take protective actions against the economic risks that they expect to bear directly.

We estimate that under reasonable assumptions about the probability of future disruptions in world oil supplies the disruption component of the social cost of U.S. oil imports ranges from less than \$2.10 to over \$7.40 per additional barrel of oil consumed by the United States, with adjustment costs accounting for the largest share of this total. An average estimate is \$4.59 (in 2005\$).

III.3 Policy Costs: Military Security and Strategic Petroleum Reserve Costs

The third and final commonly-identified component of possible external economic costs of oil imports is the cost U.S. taxpayers bear for existing energy security policies. Chief among these are maintaining a military presence to enhance the security of oil supply from potentially unstable regions of the world and to keep trade routes open, and maintaining the SPR to provide buffer supplies during a supply disruption. This assessment excludes both of these costs from the reported estimates for the following reasons.

Military costs are excluded because of the problems of attribution and “incrementality.” It is difficult to attribute military costs, and specific activities or forces, to oil consumption or imports *per se*. Military activities, even in world regions that represent vital sources of oil imports, undoubtedly serve a broader range of security and foreign policy objectives than simply protecting oil supplies. Furthermore, these military costs may not vary in any measurable way with incremental variations in oil use. The scope and duration of any specific U.S. military activities that were undertaken for the purpose of protecting imported oil supplies seem unlikely to be tailored to the actual volume of U.S. or world petroleum imports from the regions where they take place. As a consequence, annual expenses to support U.S. military activities do not seem likely to vary closely in response to changes in the level of oil imports prompted by conservation efforts or other policies. This does *not* mean that there is no relation between military costs and oil security concerns, but that estimating the magnitude of incremental effects from changing oil use is problematic. Our contribution here is in calculating other, economic, components of the oil import premium.

While the optimal size of the SPR, from the standpoint of its ability to cost-effectively reduce expected U.S. costs during supply disruptions, *may* be positively related to the level of U.S. oil consumption or imports, its actual size has not appeared to vary in response to changes in the volume of oil imports. There are two consistent approaches for accounting for SPR policy when calculating the incremental benefits of reduced oil use. Given lower oil imports and potentially reduced disruption costs, the analysis could consider the incremental savings from reducing the size of the SPR while maintaining the same level of expected protection. Alternatively, the analysis could include the value of the greater level of overall protection achieved with the current SPR. Since the past size or budgetary cost of the SPR have not varied directly with oil imports or consumption, the former approach posits an unlikely policy. It is also more cumbersome to analyze.³¹ Therefore, we adopt the latter approach and assume no change in the SPR from its current size.³² However, our estimates do explicitly account for the role of the SPR in addressing shock effects and reducing disruption costs.

SPR use during a disruption requires a Presidential determination of need based on a range of economic, foreign policy, and national security considerations.³³ Since past use during some disruptions has been cautionary, future use in all possible disruptions is neither assured nor official policy. The current analysis considers two SPR management strategies: idealized SPR use, with a prompt and full offset of all major supply shocks, to the extent of SPR capabilities; and a more cautionary SPR strategy in which the SPR is applied to shocks in half of the events. When calculating the premium, a range of shocks is probabilistically simulated and, depending on the size and duration of the supply loss and the SPR utilization strategy, some or all of shock price increase may be eliminated. To the extent that the current SPR is able to more completely buffer shocks and their costs at lower import levels, that marginal cost change is accounted in the premium.

³¹See Leiby and Bowman (1998, 2003) and U.S. DOE (1990) for comparatively recent studies of SPR expected net benefits and optimal size. Earlier studies were by, e.g. Teisberg (1981), Hogan (1982), Murphy, Toman and Weiss (1986) and Devarajan and Weiner (1989).

³²This analysis does reflect the impact of a larger current SPR (688 million barrels) than was available at the time of the 1997 study (600 million barrels). Under the International Energy Agency (IEA) agreement, all signatories agree to hold emergency oil stocks equivalent to 90 days of oil imports, in crude or product form (See e.g. IEA 2007, *IEA Response System for Oil Supply Emergencies*.) There is some flexibility of accounting, particularly regarding how private inventories are included along with public stocks. The U.S. DOE's current assessment is that the IEA requirements are met and exceeded, since "SPR and private company import protection" is measured as approximately 118 days (U.S. DOE Fossil Energy website, <http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/reserves/spr/spr-facts.html>).

³³Specifically, under Section 3 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, the President must ordinarily make a determination of a "severe energy supply interruption". For more details, see the U.S. DOE SPR website <http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/reserves/spr/spr-epca.html>.

IV.1 Marginal Welfare Changes and the Mathematical Definition of the Marginal Premium

The principal method used in this paper is the marginal analysis of U.S. welfare, employing the standard concepts of the *economic* welfare function and the oil import premium. The marginal cost of imported oil (in dollars per barrel) is the incremental cost associated with a unit change in oil imports.³⁴ Its estimation does not require that we know total costs, but only how total costs change with the level of oil imports.

We begin with a functional description of how U.S. economic net benefits $N(q_{iu})$ depend on the level of oil imports (q_{iu}).^{35 36} Given the focus on imports, it is convenient to combine the domestic oil demand and oil supply curves into a net import demand curve. This corresponds to combining the private benefits of consumption and the private costs of domestic production into an import private benefits function $B_i(q_{iu})$. The net economic welfare function includes import benefits $B_i(q_{iu})$, less the direct costs of imports ($P_w q_{iu}$), and less all other costs associated with externalities, shocks, and market failures ($C_f(q_{iu})$), which individual producers and consumers do not ordinarily consider in their market transactions.

$$N(q_{iu}) = B_i(q_{iu}) - P_w q_{iu} - C_f(q_{iu}) \quad (1)$$

The marginal welfare from a change in imports is then the marginal private benefit of imports less the marginal direct cost of imports less all the other identified marginal non-private costs:

$$\begin{aligned} N'_{social} &\equiv \frac{dN(q_{iu})}{dq_{iu}} = B'_i - \frac{d(P_w q_{iu})}{dq_{iu}} - \frac{dC_f(q_{iu})}{dq_{iu}} \\ &= B'_i - (P_w + q_{iu} P'_w) - \frac{dC_f(q_{iu})}{dq_{iu}} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Here the prime symbol (') denotes the total derivative with respect to import levels. The *oil import premium* is defined as the difference between the marginal *private* net benefits of oil and the marginal *social* net benefits. Since it is generally believed that the social benefits of imports equal the private benefits, the import premium is the difference between marginal social costs and

³⁴Technically, marginal cost is the derivative of total cost, and is based on an infinitesimal change in oil use. Its units are dollars per barrel.

³⁵ The term "net benefits" means the difference between benefits and costs. Similarly, regional "net import demand" refers to the difference between a region's oil demand and its supply. Net benefits can be measured relative to an arbitrary reference point, since our interest is in marginal changes.

³⁶ Naturally, net benefit also depends on levels of oil production and consumption, but at first we abstract from these issues. For example, the macroeconomic dislocation losses from disruptions are expected to be more directly a function of oil or energy consumption levels or intensities than import levels. However, even if the contemplated policies directly target consumption, because of the identity linking supply, demand and imports a separate examination of the import premium alone is informative. Certain costs, notably the sustained costs of non-competitive oil supply and the higher import costs borne during disruptions, are directly functions of imports. Others, such as macroeconomic disruption costs may be indirectly functions of imports to the extent that import levels alter the expected frequency or magnitude of shocks or the severity of their impact on the oil market. It is these direct and indirect marginal effects of import levels that we focus on here, in keeping with the established literature on the import premium as an informative guideline for energy security or dependence policies.

marginal private costs.³⁷ The marginal private cost of oil is the prevailing domestic oil price. This equals the world oil price, P_w , if there are no tariffs or binding import/export constraints. At any level of U.S. imports q_{iu} the oil import premium, π , being the difference between marginal social and marginal private cost, is:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi(q_{iu}) &\equiv C'_{social} - C'_{private} \\ &= \left(P_w + q_{iu}P'_w + \frac{dC_f(q_{iu})}{dq_{iu}} \right) - P_w \\ &= \left(q_{iu}P'_w + \frac{dC_f(q_{iu})}{dq_{iu}} \right)\end{aligned}\quad (3)$$

As will be discussed below, the first term of the premium corresponds to the monopsony or consumer buying power premium. Strictly speaking the second term includes all other marginal social losses associated with imports, but in this study we limit our attention to identifying and estimating the expected economic losses from disruptions. So in keeping with earlier approaches as far back as Plummer (1982) we divide the oil import premium into two components: the monopsony premium and the disruption premium:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi(q_{iu}) &\equiv \pi_{monops}(q_{iu}) + \pi_{disr}(q_{iu}) \\ &= q_{iu}P'_w + \frac{dE[C_{disr}(q_{iu})]}{dq_{iu}}\end{aligned}\quad (4)$$

The two components are essentially long-run and short-run in nature respectively, since the first accounts for the effect of a sustained import reduction on the long-run undisrupted oil price, while the second principally includes the change in expected short-run losses during future transitory disruptions. A key challenge of this analysis is to identify those costs stemming from market imperfections which are not accounted for in private behavior, and which vary at the margin with oil imports (or oil consumption).

³⁷ Note that so long as private oil purchasers gain all the benefits of oil consumption (so that marginal private benefit equals marginal social benefit) and there exists no import tax or constraints (so that the marginal private cost of oil equals the world oil price) then the import premium can be defined as the marginal social costs of imports minus the price of imported oil.

$$\begin{aligned}\pi &\equiv N'_{private} - N'_{social} = (B'_{private} - C'_{private}) - (B'_{social} - C'_{social}) \\ &= C'_{social} - C'_{private} = C'_{social} - P_w\end{aligned}$$

More generally, for tariff $\tau \neq 0$, $P_i = P_w + \tau$

$$\pi(Q_{iu}) = C'_{social} - P_w - \tau = q_{iu}P'_w + \frac{dE[C_{disr}(q_{iu})]}{dq_{iu}} - \tau$$

IV.2 The Base Import Premium and the Optimal Import Premium

The premium can be measured under base conditions (of current, essentially free-market policy) or under conditions where policy has reduced import demand. The former estimates the per-barrel social gains from a small imports reduction from the current base level, while the latter estimates the per-barrel marginal social gains after imports have been reduced by a non-trivial quantity. Once the socially efficient level of imports is identified (that which maximizes social net benefit), the "optimal" import premium which applies at that level can be estimated. As imports decline, the premium declines.³⁸

A graphical representation may clarify the concepts of the base and optimal premia. Under free-market policy, import demand will adjust until the marginal private benefit equals world price, and the marginal private net benefit is zero. This is shown by the intersection of the import supply and demand curves in Figure 2, at imports level M_o . The base premium, $\pi(M_o)$, is shown as the difference between the private marginal cost (import supply) curve P_w and the social marginal cost curve C'_{social} above imports level M_o . As shown, the premium is greater for higher levels of oil use if the social costs rise faster with use than privately accounted costs (i.e., than the world oil price).

³⁸This is because the marginal social costs of imports, beyond price, are an increasing function of the level of imports.




Figure 2: Deviation Between Marginal Social Cost and Marginal Private Cost of Imports Implies a Premium.

If a policy is introduced to reduce imports below the free market level, M_0 , to any other level, say M , then the marginal private benefits diverge from private costs. When imports are reduced to the level M^* , the optimal imports level, the social marginal cost curve intersects the private demand curve (Figure 2). Social marginal costs equal social and private marginal benefits and no further reduction is beneficial:

$$\begin{aligned} C'_{social}(M^*) &= P_d(M^*) = B'_{social}(M^*) \\ P_d(M^*) - P_w(M^*) &= \pi(M^*) \equiv \pi^* \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

Note that neither the premium nor the level of imports is necessarily reduced to zero at the optimal level M^* . Many studies of oil import costs seek to estimate the optimal premium, since it serves as a guide for longer-run policy after a transition to lower level imports has been made. On the other hand, the base or "current market" premium provides an estimate of the potential social gain from reducing imports by a small amount from their current level, and suggests a level

of societal effort or incentive that may be appropriate for some time until progress in reducing oil use is achieved. The results presented here focus on the smaller “optimal premium.” For comparison we present estimates of the somewhat higher “base” or “current premium” in Appendix A.

The oil import premium is a useful concept for summarizing non-market costs, but should not be directly interpreted as an instrument of policy (e.g. *National Energy Strategy* Draft 1990:9). For example, Plummer *et al.* (1982) and Bohi and Montgomery (1982) make the clear point that the two basic components of the import premium associated with non-competitive market costs and disruption costs each may motivate a different policy. The import premium indicates the marginal social value of a sustained reduction in imports, but does not indicate the most efficient policy for achieving that reduction. Similarly, the disruption component of the import premium should not be interpreted as the marginal value of stockpiling against a disruption, in order to offset imports during a disruption. This value could be estimated separately, as in the Plummer *et al.* (1982) “stockpiling premium,” or numerous other stockpiling studies (e.g., Teisberg 1981; Hogan 1982; Leiby and Lee 1988; DOE/Interagency Study 1990; Leiby and Bowman 1998, 2005).

IV.3 Monopsony Power and Calculating the Monopsony Premium

This section reviews the basis of possible U.S. monopsony power, and discusses some of the issues involved in the estimation of the monopsony premium. These issues concern how to represent the response behavior of other agents in the world oil market, particularly non-U.S. importers and OPEC.

IV.3.1 Monopsony Power

Since the United States is a large consuming nation, in theory it could influence world oil prices by altering its level of imports. The monopsony premium is the marginal reduction in excess wealth transfer resulting from imports reduction. The “monopsony cost” of imported oil is the failure of oil consumers to coordinate and use their market power to recapture monopoly rents transferred to oil exporters (Murphy, Toman, and Weiss 1986:68). Broadman (1986:243) has described the monopsony cost effect as follows.

“If an increase in the demand for imports leads to a rise in the world price of oil, the increase in price affects all imports In this case, the demand increase by the marginal importer produces an external cost by raising total payments abroad for oil imports by more than the price [it pays].”

Most analysts agree that the United States has at least limited monopsony power. However, they disagree about whether that power can and should be exercised. Some argue that the monopsony power of the United States is, in fact, very small. In the past, others have argued that the explicit exercise of monopsony power, especially the adoption of an import tariff or quota, could call for retaliation on the part of oil exporters. Clearly some policies to exercise monopsony power are

more visible and provocative than others. The prospect for retaliation may be related to the manner in which monopsony power is used. The argument that OPEC would fully offset or even retaliate in response to a U.S. import reduction might have greater plausibility when OPEC is poorly coordinating its monopoly power and is at best acting as a "clumsy cartel." In this case, the blatant and prominent assertion of monopsony power could lead to greater solidification of the oil cartel and result in world oil price increases. On the other hand, the suggestion of OPEC retaliation becomes less compelling at times (such as the current and projected market conditions) when OPEC is already exercising substantial supply restraint and maintaining prices at comparatively high levels.

To the extent that the United States has monopsony power and faces non-competitive global oil supply, there is an opportunity to act and reduce total U.S. costs. The greater the U.S. share of the world oil market, the greater the potential of the United States to exercise monopsony power.

The impacts of an import reduction depend on the elasticity of net import supply, which is the subject of some uncertainty. The premium estimates here include a market-based response by other importers and non-OPEC producers as prices fall, partially offsetting the monopsony power of the United States. The United States is a net importer of oil, as is the group of all other nations outside of OPEC, collectively. The monopsony power of the United States and the size of the monopsony premium increases with the share of world oil trade comprised by U.S. imports.³⁹ For 2006 to 2015, the projected average level of U.S. imports as a share of OPEC net exports (total non-OPEC net imports) is around 36 percent. (In the mid 1990s the current and projected U.S. share was near 30 percent.)

IV.3.2 Issues in Estimating the Monopsony Premium

In the above exposition on the import premium, the first term in the premium of Equation (4) corresponds to the monopsony premium. The monopsony premium is just the incremental change in world oil price induced by a unit import reduction times the level of imports:

$$\pi_{monops}(q_{iu}) = P'_w q_{iu} \quad (6)$$

³⁹ The elasticity of net import supply (η_{is}) can be decomposed into the elasticity of OPEC supply (η_{so}) and the elasticity of net import demand from non-U.S., non-OPEC regions (η_{in}):

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{monops} &= \frac{P_w}{\eta_i} \\ \eta_{is} &= \frac{\eta_{so} q_{so} - \eta_{in} q_{in}}{q_{iu}} \\ \Rightarrow \pi_{monops} &= \frac{P_w \sigma_U}{\eta_{so} - \eta_{in}(1 - \sigma_U)} \end{aligned}$$

where σ_U is the share of non-OPEC net imports imported by the United States, that is $\sigma_U \equiv q_{iu}/(q_{iu} + q_{in})$.

If η_{is} is the price elasticity of net oil import supply to the U.S., then the imported oil monopsony premium is also expressible as:

$$\pi_{monops}(q_{iu}) = \frac{P_w(q_{iu})}{\eta_{is}} \quad (7)$$

The social cost exceeds the private cost by P/η_{is} . This formula shows explicitly that the monopsony premium will vary with world oil price, import levels, and the price elasticity of net supply of imports to the United States. If the supply of imports is very elastic, the monopsony premium will be very small, and very large if supply is inelastic. This is illustrated by the following graph. For any given slope of world oil price with respect to U.S. imports the monopsony premium is greater for higher U.S. imports. For any given net elasticity of import supply to the U.S. the monopsony premium is greater for higher world oil price. Thus, by either of these measures we would expect the monopsony premium to be larger over the next decade than in the past decade.




Figure 3 Relationship of oil monopsony premium to the elasticity of net import supply to the United States, and the world price of oil.

Estimating the monopsony premium has always been recognized as difficult because it requires the specification of non-U.S. response behavior, and particularly OPEC response behavior (Plummer 1981:6). Should the United States reduce imports through some policy measures, the following categories of response are possible:

- Non-U.S. Importer Responses
 - Market-based (some limited increase in demand as price drops, no policy change)
 - Joint/coordinated policy effort with United States (amplifying the U.S. effect)
 - Contradictory/compensating policy (offsetting the U.S. effect)
- OPEC Supply Responses
 - Maintain production at cartel-agreed levels (zero elasticity)
 - Partial (inelastic ($\epsilon < 1$), unitary elastic ($\epsilon = 1$), elastic ($\epsilon > 1$))

- Cartelized - Full offset (perfectly elastic)
- Cartelized - Retaliatory (no supply curve)

Non-U.S. Importer Response Representation

A relevant question in assessing these potential benefits is the response of other importing countries. Will they act collectively with the United States to reduce consumption, will they not react, or will they take actions to actually increase their import levels? For the estimates reported here, we assume all other major oil consuming and importing regions outside of OPEC do not alter their policies, but respond competitively to any price reduction induced by U.S. policy. However, it is worth noting that virtually all oil importing countries are concerned about their oil consumption and import levels, including the members of the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and a group of Northeast Asian nations including China. They are actively exploring new policies to limit oil use, for a variety of environmental, energy security, and sustainability motivations.⁴⁰ Thus, the assumption of a purely free-market, no-policy response by the rest of the world outside of OPEC must be interpreted as an upper bound on the degree to which other importers would offset any U.S. import reduction by increasing their demand.

The marginal benefits to the United States of a coordinated policy with other oil consuming nations would be greater than those of a unilateral action, because of the global nature of the monopsony gains. The estimated import or consumption premium would be correspondingly higher, when a coordinated policy is compared to the free market outcome. Under coordinated policy action, non-U.S. importers are typically assumed to reduce their consumption in the same proportion as the United States (e.g., Stobaugh 1979). The early Energy Modeling Study (EMF-6, 1982) considered the base monopsony premium or "buying power wedge" for both unilateral and joint OECD action. Tests with nine oil models all indicated that the base monopsony premium was 3 to 3.5 times larger given coordinated OECD action (Gately 1982:46). Joint action by the United States and other importers effectively increases the share of world oil trade under monopsony control, and increases the monopsony premium faster than linearly with the share of imports monopsonized (see previous footnote).⁴¹

⁴⁰Recent examples of global attentiveness to oil imports and energy security are manifold and readily available. For example, for the IEA, see numerous reports and workshops documented at their website including IEA 2007 *Oil Supply Security- Emergency Response of IEA Countries*. For APEC, see e.g. APERC 2007 *A Quest for Energy Security in the 21st Century*, in which indices of energy security are considered, some of which focus on oil imports and dependence on unstable supplies. See also their report *Energy Security Initiative: Some Aspects of Energy Security*, APERC 2003. For Northeast Asian nations, see http://www.iea.org/Textbase/work/workshopdetail.asp?WS_ID=178 for the "Joint Conference on Northeast Asia Energy Security and Cooperation (2004). For ASEAN, see, e.g. the 2007 workshop "Oil Security and National Emergency Preparedness," joint with IEA (http://www.iea.org/Textbase/work/workshopdetail.asp?WS_ID=331).

⁴¹An extreme alternative to joint action by importers is the possibility of contradictory/compensating measures in other importing countries. Brown and Huntington (1994) note that Hoel's (1991) work on unilateral environmental actions also applies to unilateral oil conservation efforts: unilateral action by the United States could weaken its bargaining position with other importers who are considering comparable policy. In this case other countries could relax their efforts and, in theory, world oil imports could increase. It seems especially unlikely that other major oil consuming countries would take an opportunistic or even non-cooperative strategy given current widespread concern about the need for energy conservation and climate change.

OPEC Supply Response Representation

Most estimates of the monopsony premium component assume some positive relation between price and OPEC supply, or include OPEC supply in a world import supply curve (e.g., EMF-6, Gately 1982; Broadman and Hogan 1986; Walls 1990; Huntington 1993). If OPEC is a true monopolistic supplier, then there is no well-defined conventional upward-sloping supply curve. A monopolist sets a price in inverse proportion to the elasticity of demand for its product, so in this case it may be more important for an import demand policy to increase demand elasticity than reduce the quantity demanded.

Nesbitt and Choi (1988) offer one polar alternative representation of OPEC supply. They apply a depletable-resource cartel model of OPEC behavior to estimate the effects of an import tariff and conclude "the degree of monopsony power that can be exerted by the United States is small, indeed almost minuscule" (Nesbitt and Choi 1988:46). They estimate that a \$10.50 tariff such as that proposed by Broadman and Hogan would sharply reduce U.S. imports (by 30 percent in the first year) but would only reduce world oil price by \$1.30/BBL. The insensitivity of world price to demand results from their assumption of a highly elastic world supply, and the treatment of oil supply according to dynamic depletable resource theory, in which price paths are strongly driven by the estimated resource base size and backstop price. However, the limits of depletable resource theory as a positive description of petroleum markets are well established (e.g. Watkins 1992, 2005). Alternatively, viewing OPEC as a von Stackelberg monopolist suggests that while the elasticity of import supply may be ill-defined, the price charged will depend on U.S. consumption via the effect of U.S. consumption on OPEC's market share (Greene 1991; Greene and Leiby 1993). If the world could somehow reduce OPEC's market share enough, there would be pressure for prices to return toward competitive market levels.

Some critics of the monopsony premium approach question whether the exercise of monopsony power would be a justifiable interference in oil markets. If monopsony power can lower monopoly prices, why not use it to lower competitive market prices as well? Why not use it in all arenas of international trade? According to standard theory, there are two good reasons: 1) competitive market prices produce an economically efficient allocation of resources; and 2) the indiscriminate exercise of monopsony power would undermine painstakingly negotiated free trade agreements. In short, there is too much to lose. If free trade in competitive world markets is the goal, then indiscriminate use of monopsony power against competitive producers would be counterproductive, but judicious use of monopsony power against monopoly pricing may be a step in the right direction.

IV.4 Methodology for Calculating the Disruption Component of the Oil Import Premium

We defined (Eq. 5) the disruption component of the import premium as the marginal change in expected disruption losses:

$$\pi_{disr}(q_{iu}) \equiv \frac{\partial E[C_{disr}(q_{iu})]}{\partial q_{iu}} \quad (8)$$

Consider representing the uncertain future oil market by a set of possible discrete market states (disruptions sizes and lengths) indexed by j . Thus, the expected disruption cost over the next decade is taken over a set of possible supply losses ΔQ_j each with annual probability ϕ_j . For each possible disruption ΔQ_j with an associated increase in imported oil price of $\Delta P_i(\Delta Q_j)$, the disruption costs are composed of the incremental imports costs (foreign payments) plus the dislocational GNP losses due to the disruption price. The expected total disruption costs are the probability-weighted sum:

$$E_{\{\Delta Q_j\}}[C_{disr}] = \sum_j \phi_j [C_{Idisr}(\Delta P(\Delta Q_j)) + C_{GNPdisr}(\Delta P(\Delta Q_j))] \quad (9)$$

The disruption premium is the marginal change of this expected cost expression with respect to the long-run level of U.S. oil imports, q_{iu} .

IV.4.1 Disruption Premium - Import Cost Component

Consider the marginal change in the first term, disruption import cost, recognizing that added import costs during a disruption are given by the change in price times the level of imports during the disruption, q_{iD} :

$$C_{Idisr}(\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})) = q_{iD} \cdot \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}) \quad (10)$$

We write the disruption price change ΔP as a function of both the disruption quantity loss ΔQ and the pre-disruption level of imports, acknowledging that the latter may influence market responses during the disruption. Taking the derivative:

$$\pi_{Idisr}(q_{iu}) \equiv \frac{dE_{\{\Delta Q_j\}}[C_{Idisr}]}{dq_{iu}} = \frac{d}{dq_{iu}} \sum_j \phi_j [q_{iD} \cdot \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})] \quad (11)$$

There are many channels by which changing import levels during normal (undisrupted) periods could influence the import costs during a disruption. These channels are highlighted by the each of the three terms in the derivative of the product of ϕ_j , q_{iD} , and ΔP below:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{d}{dq_{iu}} \sum_j \phi_j [q_{id} \cdot \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})] \\
&= \sum_j \left(\frac{\partial \phi_j}{\partial q_{iu}} \right) [q_{id} \Delta P(\Delta Q_j)] + \sum_j \phi_j \left(\frac{\partial q_{id}}{\partial q_{iu}} \right) [\Delta P(\Delta Q_j)] + q_{iu} \sum_j \phi_j \frac{d}{dq_{iu}} [\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})]
\end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. 12 is the effect of pre-disruption import levels on the *probability* of disruption. This is sometimes called the deterrence effect if reducing import levels is thought to reduce the likelihood of intentional shocks. While models of this type of effect could be offered, in which the likelihood of some categories of disruption (e.g. embargoes or terrorist attacks) might diminish with U.S. import levels, in this analysis we do not include any effect of import levels on disruption probability (i.e., $\partial \phi / \partial q_{iu} = 0$). An alternative, non-zero assumption about the marginal effect of pre-disruption imports on disruption likelihood, even if very small, would have a pronounced effect on the premium estimate.

The second term is the direct effect of reducing pre-disruption import levels on the number of import barrels that are subject to the price increase ΔP during disruptions. The import levels during the disruption event will be somewhat different from the long-run pre-disruption import levels, given short-run price responses, and income responses if GDP contracts. The reduction of normal-period oil imports by one barrel would reduce the level of oil imports during random disruptions by roughly, but not exactly, one barrel. If the reduction is one-to-one ($dq_{id}/dq_{iu} = 1.0$), then this term for the cost reduction per barrel of import reduction is just the expected price increase due to shocks ($E_{\{\Delta Q\}}[\Delta P(\Delta Q)]$). We track this cost component but recognize that it is not necessarily entirely external to the decision calculus of economic actors who consume or import oil. This direct price increase that must be paid by those using another barrel of oil at the time of a (random and presumably unexpected) shock may be partially or fully accounted-for by foresighted agents when they make oil purchases during the undisrupted periods. Given our decadal planning period, the key here is the degree to which prospective geopolitical oil disruptions over the next decade are both anticipated and accommodated through preparatory behavior when oil purchases are made at any time in the decade. We assume that ordinarily some-to-all of the shock price increase is internalized. As mentioned, this component of the disruption premium is reduced by the fraction posited to be internalized, based on a parameter that takes values of 0%, 25%, and 100% internalization.

The third term in the import-cost component of the disruption premium is the expected change in import costs due to the impact of pre-disruption import levels q_{iu} on the magnitude of the price increase during each possible disruption. This component can be further decomposed.

$$q_{iu} \sum_j \phi_j \frac{\partial}{\partial q_{iu}} [\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})] = q_{iu} \sum_j \phi_j \left[\frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial \Delta Q_j} \frac{\partial \Delta Q_j}{\partial q_{iu}} + \frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial q_{iu}} \right] \tag{13}$$

Note that this term is an exact analog to the pre-disruption monopsony premium ($q_{iu} dP/dq_{iu}$), where in this case we are accounting for the impact of U.S. import levels on the expected disruption price *increase* rather than the pre-disruption price *level*. Again, the monopsony effect is not likely to be considered by individual economic agents, and again it is powerful by being multiplied by the entire level of imports.

The expected price increase from shock is governed by the bracketed terms, which are the indirect effect of pre-disruption import levels on the expected size of the supply loss, and the effect of pre-disruption import levels on the sensitivity of shock price change ΔP to the quantity of supply loss ΔQ_j (that is, the effect of import levels on the short run elasticity of global net import demand).

IV.4.2 Disruption Premium - GDP Dislocation Cost Component

Analogous to the premium associated with import costs during disruptions, the GDP dislocation premium component is the marginal change in expected GDP losses during disruptions. For a discrete distribution of disruptions sizes ΔQ_j each with annual probability ϕ_j

$$\pi_{GDPdisr}(q_{iu}) \equiv \frac{dE_{\{\Delta Q\}}[C_{GDPdisr}]}{dq_{iu}} = \frac{d}{dq_{iu}} \sum_j \phi_j \cdot \Delta GDP(\Delta P_j, q_{du}(q_{iu})) \quad (14)$$

for

$$\Delta P_j = \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})$$

This formulation highlights the relationship between GDP losses and the disruption induced price change ΔP_j , as well as the possibility that the magnitude of GDP loss for any given price change could also depend directly on the level of U.S. oil demand q_{du} . In this formal analysis we are examining the marginal effect of an import reduction on societal costs, *without* positing a particular change in domestic supply or demand to generate the imports change. Thus, for this partial equilibrium analysis, we hold domestic demand levels fixed and drop q_{du} from the equations. More generally, if we know that the policy that causes the imports reduction is an oil demand reduction, then there would be an additional disruption premium component associated with the change in GDP sensitivity to oil price changes:

$$\pi_{GDPdisr}(q_{iu}) \equiv \sum_j \frac{d\phi_j}{dq_{iu}} \cdot \Delta GDP(\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})) + \sum_j \phi_j \cdot \frac{d}{dq_{iu}} \Delta GDP(\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})) \quad (15)$$

Again, we omit the possible effect of import levels on disruption probability ϕ_j , and expand the second term:

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi_{GDPdisr}(q_{iu}) &\equiv \sum_j \phi_j \frac{\partial \Delta GDP}{\partial \Delta P} \frac{\partial}{\partial q_{iu}} (\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})) \\
&= \frac{\partial \Delta GDP}{\partial \Delta P} \sum_j \phi_j \left[\frac{\partial \Delta P}{\partial \Delta Q} \frac{\partial \Delta Q}{\partial q_{iu}} + \frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial q_{iu}} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

These are the terms that must be evaluated to determine the GDP-Dislocation component of the Disruption import premium. The bracketed terms are the same two components that were identified for the Disruption Premium Import Cost component, which determine the marginal effect of pre-disruption import levels on the expected disruption price change. Note that we do *not* assume any change in the sensitivity of GDP to price shocks from a change in the level of imports (the GDP elasticity $\epsilon_{y,p}$ is held constant), since the GDP losses from oil shocks are thought to be more properly a function of consumption levels. If the change in imports is also accompanied by a change in consumption, then the full import/consumption premium would be larger by that term.

IV.5 Calculating the Total Optimal Premium

The total premium at any level of imports q_{iu} is given by the sum of the monopsony and disruption components:

$$\pi_{tot}(q_{iu}) \equiv \pi_{monops}(q_{iu}) + \pi_{Idisr}(q_{iu}) + \pi_{GDPdisr}(q_{iu}) \tag{17}$$

These premium components and the total premium $\pi_{tot}(q_{iu})$ can be calculated for any level of imports q_{iu} . The optimal premium can be numerically determined by iteratively searching for the level of imports that equalizes marginal social costs and marginal private consumption benefits (see Figure 2 and the discussion). The net import supply to the United States is composed of the posited OPEC supply behavior minus the non-U.S. net import demand curve. The resulting function for net import supply can be inverted to yield the world price of oil as a function of U.S. import demand, $P_w(q_{iu})$. Similarly, long-run U.S. domestic supply curves and demand curves combine to yield the U.S. net import demand curve, which can be inverted to yield the marginal benefits of U.S. oil imports, $B_{priv}'(q) = P_D(q_{iu})$. By definition, the marginal social cost of oil imports is the sum of the world price of oil plus the marginal oil import premium:

$$C'_{social}(q_{iu}) \equiv P_w(q_{iu}) + \pi_{tot}(q_{iu}) \tag{18}$$

The optimal import premium π^* is the premium at the import level q_{iu}^* that equalizes marginal social costs and marginal private consumption benefits:

$$\begin{aligned}
C'_{social}(q_{iu}^*) &= B'_{social}(q_{iu}^*) = B'_{private}(q_{iu}^*) \\
P_w(q_{iu}^*) + \pi_{tot}(q_{iu}^*) &= P_D(q_{iu}^*) \\
\pi^* &\equiv \pi_{tot}(q_{iu}^*)
\end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

V. Results

A range of results was constructed by probabilistic simulation, reflecting uncertainty regarding the key factors.

- All estimates utilize the Base oil market projection from the 2007 EIA *Annual Energy Outlook* (AEO2007). (Otherwise, accounting for uncertainty regarding the future oil price path by using a combination of EIA High, Base, and Low price outlooks, the range of estimates is wider and asymmetrically somewhat higher).
- OPEC supply response elasticity varies from 0 to 6, with mode of 1.0 and a mean of 1.76.
- Long-run supply and demand elasticity for non-U.S./non-OPEC regions are on net about double the 1997 study values, and U.S. supply and demand elasticities are unchanged.
- Disruption probabilities are taken from the Energy Modeling Forum 2005 survey (see EMF/Beccue and Huntington 2005), aggregated into three discrete disruption sizes (see Appendix C for more details).
- A wider range of values for the GDP loss elasticity with respect to oil shock price of -0.01 to -0.08 was judged to encompass essentially the bulk of recent econometric and modeling estimates for the cumulative loss of GDP for 2-3 years after a shock, expressed as a percentage of one-year's GDP. This range was used in a sensitivity case. However, for the base set of results presented in Table 1, the GDP Loss elasticity range was somewhat shifted down to account for the possibility that the sensitivity of the economy to oil price shocks may have diminished over time. The range used for Table 1 varied from -0.01 to -0.054, with a mean of -0.032. Further examination of this issue is merited.
- Short-run elasticity of U.S. import demand ranges from -0.087 to -0.163. This range is supported by the range of estimates from the literature shown in Appendix A, although an argument can be made for smaller short-run elasticities.
- Disruption size reduction with imports varies from 0% to 30%, with the upper end corresponding roughly to the share of world oil trade flows demanded by U.S. imports.

Parameter distributions are generally taken as either discrete over three low-mid-high values (with probabilities of 25%, 50% and 25% each) or as a continuous triangular distribution.

Table 1: Summary Results		
Effect / Study	ORNL 1997 Report (2005\$/BBL)	ORNL 2007 Updated (2005\$/BBL)
Monopsony Component	\$2.64 (\$1.58 - \$3.69)	\$7.41 (\$2.77 - \$13.11)
Macroeconomic Disruption/ Adjustment Costs	\$1.06 (\$1.06 - \$2.11)	\$4.59 (\$2.10 - \$7.40)
Total Mid-point	\$3.59 (\$2.64-\$5.80)	\$12.00 (\$6.67 - \$17.95)
Results in 2005\$. Columns report mean estimate and ranges. In the case of the 1997 report, the ranges reflect the subjectively defined "narrowed range." In the case of the new study, the ranges include 90% of results from the risk-analysis simulation.		

The estimated range and mean value for each component of the import premium is shown in Table 1, reproduced in this section for convenience. The estimated oil import premium for the United States is composed of about two-thirds monopsony premium and one-third disruption premium. Over the full range of simulations, the net elasticity of oil import supply to the United States varies from 3.2 to over 21 (90% fall between 4.3 and 18.0, mean value is 8.9). This assumes a fairly high degree of market responsiveness to any U.S. initiative, with the monopsony premium being lower as the market responsiveness is greater. One informative measure is the implied change in world oil prices from a change in U.S. imports. For the stated elasticity range, the implied oil price decrease per million-barrel-per-day reduction in U.S. imports ranges from \$0.17/bbl to \$2.43/bbl (the 90% confidence interval is smaller), with a value for the mean premium estimate of about \$0.71/bbl/MMBD. This price-sensitivity is well within the range of other estimates.⁴² The disruption premium in turn is about 55 percent macroeconomic losses from dislocation and 45 percent losses from increased oil import costs during shocks.

Generally, the updated import premium estimates are notably higher than those we produced in 1997. While higher, this result is consistent with many other estimates (e.g. Plummer 1982, Broadman and Hogan 1988, Huntington 1993), which were constructed at times when oil market conditions were more similar to those currently projected by EIA than the conditions of the mid-1990s. This is seen in Figure 4, which plots the newest estimates (enclosed in the ellipse on the right side of the graph) along with estimated ranges from 11 other studies.⁴³ At least two

⁴²As one basis of comparison, the NRC (2002) cited other (EMF) studies in which the oil price would be decreased by between 0.8 percent and 2.9 percent per million barrel per day oil import reduction. They noted that "applying that same percentage to current [2001] prices would give a monopsony component between \$2.20 and \$8.20/bbl." Applying the same price sensitivity here to average EIA projected prices for the next 10 years implies price changes (slopes) of -\$0.36/bbl/MMBD to -\$1.31/bbl/MMBD, and monopsony premia ranging from \$4.61/bbl to \$16.70/bbl.

⁴³Source studies for this graph included: Bohi & Montgomery 1981, EMF 1982, Broadman 1986, Behrens *et al.* (CRS) 1992, Huntington 1993, CEC 1994, Leiby *et al.* ORNL 1997, Moore *et al.* CRS 1998, NRC 2002, Parry & Darmstadter 2004, and Leiby 2006.

of the studies (EMF 1982 and Huntington 1983) also provided ranges derived from multiple oil market models. Results from each study are plotted according to their publication date. Each of these study ranges was based on prevailing or projected oil market conditions around the time of the study. While many oil market conditions contribute to the premium estimate, we have superimposed the contemporaneous world oil price on the plotted estimates as one important market indicator.




Figure 4 New estimates are consistent with past estimates under similar market conditions.

Finally, we note that the possible range from our current study is wider still if one considers the simultaneous combination of all best- or worst-case assumptions. However, the likelihood of these more extreme combinations should be viewed as remote.

V.1 Alternate Cases

Table 4 presents a sequence of alternative cases from the one selected as a reasonable central case for Table 1. The case shown in Table 1 appears in column (6) of Table 4. All of the values in this table are for the optimal premium (not the base premium), in year 2005 dollars.⁴⁴ The central values presented are the mean estimates for each case, and they refer to the *long-run* premium value per barrel of oil imports, as an average over the next ten years (2006-2015). The ranges presented for the components and for the total are all 90% confidence intervals based on the selected ranges for parameter uncertainty and the probabilistic simulation of the premium model.

Case 0 is the result presented in the July 2007 draft study, developed in support of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). In this case OPEC response is treated parametrically, with supply elasticities varying from 0.25 - 5.0. The non-U.S./non-OPEC elasticity adopted the same value as the 1997 Leiby *et al.* study, which was -0.876. The combination of the OPEC and non-U.S./non-OPEC elasticities lead to a net elasticity of import supply to the U.S. ranging from 3 to 15. Disruption probabilities are from the EMF 2005 Estimates, and the oil market outlook is taken from the AEO2006 Base case. This case leads to a premium estimate of \$13.97, roughly two-thirds of which is the long-run monopsony premium, and one-third is the disruption premium.

Case 1 was run to make a close comparison of the 1997 study with a case based on current expectations about the oil market. The two principle changes are an update of the oil market outlook (the future price and regional supply and demand projections) from the AEO1994 Base Case to the AEO2007 Base Case, and the use of new disruption likelihoods from EMF 2005 (Appendix C). Among other things, this means average crude price rises from \$21.45 to \$50.99 per barrel (2005\$). Other specific changes related to the oil market projection alone are summarized in Table 2. All elasticities match the values used in the 1997 study (non-U.S./non-OPEC elasticity of import demand is -0.876, the parametric treatment of OPEC response uses a triangular distribution for supply elasticity ranging from 1.0-5.0 with mode 2.0). The monopsony premium is much lower in this case than Case 0 or most other cases, because of the assumption that OPEC supply elasticity is *at least* unitary or greater. Note that the Leiby *et al.* 1997 study also presented cases with OPEC supply responses that were much less than unitary-elastic, but they were not in the “narrowed range” of estimates that subsequently received greater attention. This assumption of a highly flexible and price-responsive supply, which might have been plausible in the mid-to-late 1990s, is no longer reasonable at a time when OPEC is more rigorously controlling output and supporting rapid increases of from \$5 to \$10 per barrel for every million barrel-per-day growth in demand over the last decade. In the last 10 years since our prior report was published (September 1997 to September 2007), OPEC output has risen 10% while *real* price has risen over 300%. Recognizing that there are conceptual problems regarding identification, partial adjustment processes are at work, and supply response is likely asymmetrical; and noting that the supply curve for a cartel is not well defined, nonetheless a

⁴⁴The mean “base,” or current premium values, which are evaluated at the currently projected base-case level of imports over the next decade, are \$1.5 to \$3.2/bbl larger than the optimal premia, depending on the case. The uncertainty range is shifted correspondingly higher, and somewhat widened. All but one of the 95%-ile estimates are above \$20/bbl, and 3 are above \$30/bbl. See Appendix A, Table A5.

simple OPEC supply “elasticity” calculation yields a minuscule +0.08 for price increases over 10 years!

Case 2 also uses the AEO2007 Base outlook, but considers a much wider range of potential OPEC responses, acknowledging greater uncertainty regarding whether OPEC will respond with elastic (elasticity ≥ 1) or inelastic (elasticity < 1) behavior. Each of these are viewed as equally likely outcomes. We note that the OPEC strategy of preserving its market share, apparently a robust strategy for long-run profit maximization (Gately 2004, 2007), entails a long-run OPEC elasticity equivalent to elasticity of supply of other, competitive producers. That is, by all estimates, an elasticity well below 1.0 (e.g. Toman (2007) suggests 0.3 following Greene and Ahmad (2005); Huntington (1994) suggests 0.2 to at most 0.6). The net result is a premium estimate similar in magnitude to Case 0, but slightly larger reflecting the changes in outlook between AEO2006 and AEO2007.

Case 3 extends Case 2 by also revising elasticities of supply and demand in the non-U.S./non-OPEC region with wider, more recent estimates. We generally follow Gately and Huntington (2002), as interpreted by Gately (2007), applying a range for elasticity of Non-U.S. Demand from -0.2 to -0.4, with mean and mode -0.3. Gately and Huntington suggest larger elasticities for non-transportation oil demand, but sharply smaller elasticities for non-OECD demand, either transportation or non-transportation. Similarly, the non-U.S./non-OPEC supply follows the same range -0.2 to -0.4, triangularly distributed with mean and mode 0.3. Together these assumptions imply that the (mode) net elasticity of import demand from non-U.S./non-OPEC regions has roughly doubled to -1.6. This variation is also responsive to the recommendations of some of the review panel. The effect of this change is to reduce the monopsony premium, but also, to some extent, the disruption premium. The latter effect follows from the slightly higher short-run responsiveness of supply outside of OPEC during disruptions.

Case 4, an alternative to Case 3, considers an even wider (and slightly higher) range of Non-U.S. Supply/Demand elasticities, to account for greater uncertainty regarding these parameters. Elasticity of Non-U.S. Demand ranges from -0.3 to -0.7, triangularly distributed with mode -0.4 and mean -0.467. Elasticity of Non-U.S. Supply is widened to 0.2 to 0.6, with mode 0.3 and mean 0.367. Together these changes imply that the (mode) net elasticity of import demand from non-U.S./non-OPEC regions is considerably more than doubled from the 1997 case, to mode -1.92, mean -2.28. If non-U.S./non-OPEC supply and demand are actually this price-responsive (on average over the next decade), then the monopsony premium would be further eroded. Greater price responsiveness means those regions would supply a little less oil and demand a little more oil if the U.S. import reduction lowers price, offsetting a bit more of the monopsony effect on non-competitive suppliers.

In Case 5 we revised Case 4 further, replacing the parametric treatment of OPEC supply-elasticity with the candidate OPEC strategic behavioral rule: Maintain Market Share (the Gately 2004 paper best strategy). This rough but robust rule implies that OPEC supply elasticity matches that of all Non-OPEC supply. As a result OPEC supply responsiveness is comparatively low, as non-OPEC supply is expected to be. As in Case 4, Non-U.S. elasticity of import demand

ranges from -1.38 to 3.52, with mode -1.92, mean -2.28. Total elasticity of Net import supply to U.S. then ranges from 4.77 to 8.63, mean 6.47. Note the narrower range of net supply response to the U.S. exercise of monopsony power under this OPEC behavioral rule. As a consequence, the 90% confidence range of the monopsony component of the premium is much narrowed.

Case 6 is a variant of Case 3. It applies a lowered range of GDP elasticity for future disruptions (range -0.01 to -0.054, midcase value -0.032), entailing lower disruption *adjustment costs*. Mean value GDP elasticity is 0.032, reduced from mean value 0.0495. OPEC-behavior is treated parametrically, and all other parameters are as in Case 3. We observe that while the mean GDP elasticity has been reduced 35%, the disruption-dislocation cost component of the premium has been reduced only 24%. We attribute this to two effects: a slight non-linearity (concavity) in the adjustment costs with respect to GDP elasticity (and the mean of a concave non-linear function is greater than the nonlinear function evaluated at the mean); and offsetting effects among premium components. This offsetting effect occurs in part because a reduction in any one component of the premium causes an increase in the level of imports (the level at which the optimal premium is calculated). A more pronounced offsetting effect is visible in the increase of a different component of the premium, the Disruption Import Costs. The disruption import costs are a function of the level of imports during a disruption. The level of imports during a disruption are in turn a function of GDP during the disruption (the income effect on demand). If we assume a lower impact of disruption price on GDP (a lower GDP elasticity), then imports stay higher during the disruption and marginal import costs rise. These are all examples of the interrelationships between the components of the optimal premium.

The final case considered, Case 7, is another case with reduced GDP impacts from shocks. It revises Case 5 (the case where OPEC strategic behavior seeks to maintain market share in response to shifts in demand) with the reduced GDP elasticity range for future disruptions (again, the range is from -0.01 to -0.054, with a mean value -0.032). The results are qualitatively similar to Case 6, in that the reduction of disruption dislocation costs of \$0.73/bbl are partially offset by a \$0.22/bbl increase in marginal import costs during the shock.

Over all these cases the mean total premium ranges from \$11.09/bbl to \$15.37/bbl. The complete range (union) of all the confidence intervals ranges from \$6.53/bbl to \$25.88/bbl. However, even if one viewed all cases as essentially equally likely, the combined 90% confidence interval would be somewhat narrower than this.

V.2 A Recommended Case

Clearly there is an unavoidable degree of uncertainty about the magnitude of marginal economic costs from the U.S. importation of petroleum, and the size of the oil import premium. We sought to reflect this with probabilistic risk analysis over key input factors, guided by the available literature and the best judgement of oil market experts. For cases shown in Table 4 that explore some plausible variations in the ranges of input assumptions, the mean premium estimates vary in a fairly moderate range, between \$11 and \$15/bbl. On balance, Case 6 is suggested as a reasonable assessment of the premium value. This is based on a review of important driving

factors, the numerical evaluations and simulations over major uncertainties, and taking into consideration the many comments and suggestions from reviewers, the EPA and other agencies. This case, and the premium range resulting from 90% of the simulated outcomes, encompasses a wide array of perspectives and potential market outcomes in response to a reduction of U.S. imports. In this recommended case the mean costs are:

Monopsony premium component	\$7.41/bbl,
Disruption component (macroeconomic and import costs)	\$4.59/bbl,
Total midpoint	\$12.00/bbl +/- ~\$6/bbl

This case relies on the most recent available projections of the U.S. and world oil market for the next 10 years, the AEO 2007 Reference Case. OPEC-behavior is treated parametrically, with a wide range of possible responses represented by a wide range of supply elasticities, from small to quite large. This recognizes that the OPEC response is the most uncertain single element, and could vary between inelastic defense of output levels, or market share, or could be highly elastic in defense of price, probably at the expense of longer run cartel power and discounted net profits. The balance between possible elastic and inelastic OPEC response is essentially even, over a fairly wide range of elasticities. This seems the best strategy until greater progress can be made in synthesizing what insights are available from the evolving strategic game-theoretic and empirical research on OPEC behavior, and advancing that research. An alternative would have been to use OPEC strategic response behavior to maximize long-run net revenue. This may well correspond to market-share preservation behavior (e.g. Case 5), and a somewhat higher premium value.

The case in Table 1 uses updated supply/demand elasticities for non-U.S./Non-OPEC region after considering more recent estimates than those used in 1997 study, and previously adopted for the 2006 RFS. As a result, the total market responsiveness is substantially greater than was the case in the draft report, and is overall quite large. The implied net offsetting response of competitive suppliers and demanders outside the U.S., to any price decline caused by a U.S. import reduction, is fairly high given that it must occur over the next 10 years, and in a global policy milieu that is generally quite attentive to conservation and energy security. Only small changes to the world oil price are anticipated from a substantial reduction in U.S. demand, on average about \$0.70/bbl for every million-barrels-per-day reduction in demand. Finally, the case uses a GDP elasticity range, the parameter which summarizes the sensitivity of GDP to oil price shocks, which is reduced compared to earlier estimates, and compared to the full range of historically-based estimates. This helps address the concerns of those who either question the conclusions of past empirical estimates or expect that the impacts of oil shocks may well be declining.

Table 4: Alternative Cases Examined. Optimal Premium, Mean and 90% Conf. Interval

Summary Results - Oil Import Premium Under Various Cases (\$2005 BBL)									
Component	Statistic	0) 2006 RFS Case (\$2005)	1) AEO2007 Base Outlook, 1997 Study Elasticities	2) AEO2007 Base Outlook, Wider range of OPEC Supply Elasticities	3) Case (2) with updated, larger NonOPEC supply/demand elasticities	4) Case (3) variant with wider, higher range of Non-US/Non-OPEC supply/demand elasticities	5) Case (4) With Applied Strategic OPEC Behavioral Rule: Maintain Market Share	6) Case (3) with Reduced GDP Elasticity	7) Case (5) with Reduced GDP Elasticity
Monopsony Component	Mean	\$9.15	\$5.25	\$9.68	\$7.34	\$6.08	\$8.83	\$7.41	\$8.89
	Range	\$3 - \$19.06	\$3.4 - \$7.73	\$2.83 - \$20.02	\$2.77 - \$12.98	\$2.58 - \$10.54	\$6.31 - \$11.72	\$2.77 - \$13.11	\$6.34 - \$11.83
Disruption: Import Costs	Mean	\$1.64	\$2.23	\$2.20	\$1.81	\$1.82	\$1.78	\$2.07	\$2.04
	Range	\$0.44 - \$3.16	\$0.48 - \$4.4	\$0.54 - \$4.31	\$0.37 - \$3.54	\$0.46 - \$3.62	\$0.42 - \$3.46	\$0.59 - \$3.84	\$0.58 - \$3.74
Disruption: Adjustment/ Dislocation Costs	Mean	\$3.18	\$3.61	\$3.49	\$3.23	\$3.29	\$3.22	\$2.52	\$2.49
	Range	\$0.8 - \$6.77	\$1 - \$6.31	\$0.98 - \$6.2	\$0.87 - \$5.88	\$0.86 - \$5.93	\$0.82 - \$5.91	\$0.85 - \$4.56	\$0.82 - \$4.59
Disruption Component Total	Mean	\$4.82	\$5.84	\$5.69	\$5.04	\$5.11	\$5.00	\$4.59	\$4.54
	Range	\$2.14 - \$8	\$2.77 - \$9.46	\$2.77 - \$9.2	\$2.38 - \$8.2	\$2.32 - \$8.24	\$2.39 - \$8.25	\$2.1 - \$7.4	\$2.12 - \$7.34
Total Costs	Mean	\$13.97	\$11.09	\$15.37	\$12.38	\$11.19	\$13.83	\$12.00	\$13.43
	Range	\$6.83 - \$23.92	\$7.59 - \$15.06	\$7.65 - \$25.88	\$6.85 - \$18.49	\$6.53 - \$16.46	\$10.41 - \$17.56	\$6.67 - \$17.95	\$10.16 - \$17.22
Total Premium in \$/Gal	Mean	\$0.33	\$0.26	\$0.37	\$0.29	\$0.27	\$0.33	\$0.29	\$0.32
<p>Variations</p> <p>0) Version Reported in Leiby/ORNL 2006 study, Table 1 (in \$2005). OPEC response treated parametrically, varying Elasticity 0.25 - 5.0. Net elast of supply to US: 3 - 15. Disruption probabilities from EMF 2005 Estimates. Oil market outlook from AEO2006 Base case.</p> <p>1) Based on AEO2007. Updated oil market outlook from AEO1994 Base Case to AEO2007 Base Case. Among other things, this means average crude price rises from \$20.33 to \$48.34. All elasticities match 1997 values. Non-US Elasticity of Import demand = -0.876, parametric treatment of OPEC response with elasticity 1.0-5.0 (triangular distribution with mode 2.0).</p> <p>2) AEO2007 Base Outlook, Wider range of OPEC Supply Elasticities, 0.25 to 6.0, Mean 1.8 (NOTE = RiskCumul(0.6,(0.25,1.4),(0.1,0.5,0.9)))</p> <p>3) Updated (2) Supply/Demand elasticities non NonOPEC region with more recent estimates. Elasticity mode elasticity of Non-US Demand -0.2 to -0.4, with mean and mode -0.3, Non-US Supply = -0.2 to -0.4, with mean and mode 0.3, implying (mode) net elasticity of import demand from NonUS/NonOPEC regions ~ doubled to -1.6.</p> <p>4) Alternative to Case (3) with expanded (and even higher) range of Non-US Supply/Demand elasticities. Elasticity Non-US Demand = -0.3 to -0.7, triangular dist with mode -0.4 mean -0.467, Elasticity of Non-US Supply = 0.2 to 0.6, mode 0.3 and mean 0.367. Implying (mode) net elasticity of import demand from NonUS/NonOPEC regions more than doubled to mode -1.92, mean -2.28.</p> <p>5) Applied Strategic OPEC Behavioral Rule to (4): Maintain Market Share (Gately 2005 paper robust strategy). This rule implies that OPEC Supply elasticity matches that of all Non-OPEC supply. As a result Non-US Elasticity of Import Demand ranges from 1.38 to 3.52, with mode 1.92. Total elasticity of Net import supply to US then ranges from 4.8 to 8.6 (90% CI).</p> <p>6) Variant on version Case (3), Considered Reduced GDP Elasticity for future disruptions (range -0.01 to -0.054, midcase value -0.032. Mean value is 0.032, reduced from mean value 0.0495). OPEC behavior treated parametrically.</p> <p>7) Revise Case 5 (which applied Strategic OPEC Behavioral Rule to (4): Maintain Market Share (Gately 2005 paper robust strategy)) with Reduced GDP Elasticity for future disruptions (range -0.01 to -0.054, midcase value -0.032. Mean value is 0.032, reduced from mean value 0.0495).</p>									

VI. Conclusions

This study assesses the marginal net economic benefits to the U.S. economy of reduced U.S. imports of oil. “Security” gains stem from reduced exposure to the economy-wide costs of potential disruptions in oil supply or spikes in oil cost. Reduced U.S. oil imports also provide sustained “monopsony” benefits over the long run even in undisrupted markets, by reducing global demand pressure and oil prices during what is expected to be an extended period of strong global demand, substantial OPEC market power, and higher world oil prices. The monopsony benefits during normal markets or disrupted markets reflect a recovery of U.S. wealth that would otherwise be extracted as cartel rents through the non-competitive exercise of market power by OPEC countries.

In the face of projected higher oil prices, growing U.S. oil imports, a large and slowly growing role of U.S. imports in world oil trade, a growing economy and a general expectation that the oil market may be somewhat more risky over the next decade, our estimate of the oil import premium is notably larger than estimated in 1997. Like our prior estimates, this study excludes possible effects of imports on U.S. costs whose relation to import levels is difficult to ascertain or measure, such as military expenditures and foreign policy effects. However, those costs remain relevant and worthy of more careful consideration.⁴⁵

Apart from omitting foreign policy, military, and national security considerations from this economic analysis, three other factors were omitted which, if included, would possibly increase the economic estimate of the premium:

- Any further premium due to risk aversion (the disruption analysis is based on expected values);
- Possible “deterrence effects” of energy security and import reduction measures (the frequency of disruptions might be reduced if greater U.S. energy security reduces the motivation for intentional shocks (embargoes or terrorist acts)); and
- Spillover benefits to U.S. allies (some benefits of U.S. import reduction, particularly the benefit of lower import prices, would spill over to all major oil consuming nations, many of which join us in a formal International Energy Agency agreement to reduce energy use and promote joint energy security. Based on prior estimates, including the full OECD premium resulting from U.S. import reduction would result in a value approximately three times larger).

This marginal “premium” approach estimates the effect on U.S. society-wide economic costs of an incremental reduction in imports. It does not directly apply to the effects of a broader policy change that not only alters the quantity of oil imports, but may also shift other features of the oil market in important ways. Possible changes in market relationships that are not modeled but could strongly influence oil security costs include:

⁴⁵For example, the Council on Foreign Relations (2006) high-level panel of energy and foreign policy experts warns that America’s dependence on imported energy increases its strategic vulnerability and constrains its ability to pursue foreign policy and national security objectives. Stern (2006) makes the strong case that large cartel rents have contributed to the development of rich, radicalized, and militarily more powerful hostile states. He argues for the exercise of U.S. monopsony power not simply to recover wealth, but because OPEC market power underwrites terror and other threats to U.S. national security.

- increased (or decreased) flexibility of demand and supply, in the short-run or long-run;
- decreased cartel power or discipline; and
- coordinated (amplifying or offsetting) policies by other oil importing countries.

While the study estimates the marginal societal economic benefit of a reduction in imports, it does not argue that an oil tax or import-tariff equal in magnitude to that marginal societal premium is an efficient policy for addressing oil security. This is because the root market failures at work are non-competitive global oil supply and the failure of long-term private oil market transactions to foresee and account for the economy-wide macroeconomic dislocations that are borne during disruptions as a consequence of the chosen pre-disruption levels of oil use. An externality-type (Pigouvian) tax on undisrupted-market oil imports does not directly or efficiently address either of these imperfections. While the oil import premium does estimate how reducing oil imports could diminish the costs of non-competitive supply and reduce macroeconomic losses during disruptions, it does not address the value to society of reducing these costs through other measures. Individual policy measures need to be evaluated in this broader context, and this analysis can provide partial insight into their appropriateness and benefit.

Appendix A: Parameters for the Updated (2007) Oil Import Premium Analysis

Table A1: Estimates of Demand and Supply Elasticities from Literature

Author	Short-Run	Long-Run	Adjustment Rate	Region
Kalymon (1975)	--	-0.5	--	various
Brown and Philips (1980)	-0.08	--	--	
Dahl (1993)	-0.05 to -0.09	-0.16 to -0.23	0.6 to 0.7	various
Peseran, et al. (1998)	-0.03	-0.48	0.9	
Gately & Huntington (2002)	-0.05	-0.59 to -0.64	0.9	OECD
Gately & Huntington (2002)	-0.03	-0.16 to -0.27	0.8 to 0.9	non-OECD
Cooper (2003)	0.0 to -0.11	0.0 to -0.53	0.8	23 countries
Cooper (2003)	-0.024 to -0.069	-0.18 to -0.45	0.8 to 0.9	G-7
Hunt & Ninomiya (2003)	--	-0.08 to -0.12	--	Japan, UK

Table: Summary of representative estimates of short-run price elasticity of demand and adjustment rates. (Source: Atkins, Frank J. and S. M. Tayyebi Jazayeri 2004.)

Disruption Probabilities

Table A2: Decadal Probabilities of 1 or More Disruptions of a Given Size			
Case	1 Million Barrels/Day	3 Million Barrels/Day	6 Million Barrels/Day
1997 Study Low	50%	10%	5%
1997 Study Mid	70%	30%	15%
EMF-2005	25%	36%	13%
See Appendix C for derivation.			

Historical Disruptions

Table A3: Historical Disruptions in the World Supply of Oil			
Type	Number	Average Duration (months)	Average Size (% of world Supply)
Accidents	5	5.2	1.1%
Internal Political Struggles	9	6.5	2.3%
International Embargos/ Economic Disputes	4-6**	11.0 (6.1*)	6.2%
Wars in Middle East	4-7**		
Total/Average	24	8.1 (6.0*)	3.7%
Notes: *Excluding 44 month Iranian Oilfield Nationalization. **Some events difficult to classify. Sources: Event listing from U.S. EIA. Categorization by Paul Leiby, ORNL.			
Summary of historical oil disruptions, 1950-2003			

Table A4: Range of Key Assumptions Used in Study			
KEY PARAMETERS/ASSUMPTIONS	Low	Mid	High
GDP disruption-loss elasticity	0.01	0.032	0.054
Disruption reduction w/ imports	0%	10%	30%
OPEC LR supply elasticity	6	1.75	0.25
Share of disruption price increase anticipated	100%	25%	0%
Disruption prob case selector	5	5	5
Disruption length (yrs)	1	1	2
SPR policy (disruption fraction offset)	100%	50%	50%
SPR policy (SPR fraction used)	100%	100%	100%
SPR size (million barrels)	688	688	688
Long run elasticity of U.S. oil demand	-30%	-27%	-20%
Long run elasticity of U.S. oil supply	46%	46%	46%
Adjustment rate for domestic oil demand	20%	15%	10%
Adjustment rate for domestic oil supply	15%	15%	15%
Oil market (AEO2007) case	1	2	3
Import oil price (\$/BBL, 2005\$)	\$43.61	\$50.99	\$64.54
Domestic oil demand (MMBD)	22.521	22.189	21.782
Domestic oil production (MMBD)	9.656	9.628	9.487
U.S. oil import level (MMBD)	12.864	12.561	12.295
Undisrupted GDP (\$billion/year, 2005\$)	\$14,637	\$14,573	\$14,479
Non-U.S. net import demand (MMBD)	22.125	21.866	17.965
OPEC supply (MMBD)	34.989	34.429	30.265
Other non-OPEC supply (MMBD)	48.580	47.466	47.716
Total supply (MMBD)	93.224	91.523	87.468
Net import supply to U.S. (MMBD)	12.864	12.583	12.300
Elasticity: non-U.S. non-OPEC net import demand	-2.157	-1.602	-1.262
Elasticity: non-U.S. non-OPEC supply	0.400	0.300	0.200
Elasticity: non-U.S. non-OPEC demand	-0.400	-0.300	-0.200
Elasticity: net import supply to U.S.	20.029	7.585	2.459

**Table A5: Alternative Estimates for *Current* Oil Import Premium,
Mean Value and 90% Confidence Interval**

Summary Results - Oil Import Premium Under Various Cases (\$2005 BBL)									
Component	Statistic	0) 2006 RFS Case (\$2005)	1) AEO2007 Base Outlook, 1997 Study Elasticities	2) AEO2007 Base Outlook, Wider range of OPEC Supply Elasticities	3) Case (2) with updated, larger NonOPEC supply/demand elasticities	4) Case (3) variant with wider, higher range of Non-US Non-OPEC supply/demand elasticities	5) Case (4) With Applied Strategic OPEC Behavioral Rule: Maintain Market Share	6) Case (3) with Reduced GDP Elasticity	7) Case (5) with Reduced GDP Elasticity
Monopsony Component	Mean	\$11.55	\$6.21	\$12.32	\$8.89	\$7.24	\$10.74	\$8.93	\$10.75
	Range	(\$3.44 - \$25.61)	(\$3.89 - \$9.31)	(\$3.35 - \$27.36)	(\$3.11 - \$16.32)	(\$2.87 - \$13.05)	(\$7.47 - \$14.62)	(\$3.13 - \$16.54)	(\$7.48 - \$14.61)
Disruption:	Mean	\$1.73	\$2.23	\$2.23	\$1.88	\$1.89	\$1.86	\$2.21	\$2.20
Import Costs	Range	(\$0.34 - \$3.58)	(\$0.31 - \$4.82)	(\$0.26 - \$4.93)	(\$0.29 - \$3.94)	(\$0.43 - \$4.02)	(\$0.32 - \$3.95)	(\$0.57 - \$4.36)	(\$0.56 - \$4.19)
Disruption: Adjustment/	Mean	\$3.63	\$4.07	\$4.04	\$3.62	\$3.66	\$3.65	\$2.89	\$2.90
Dislocation Costs	Range	(\$0.94 - \$6.69)	(\$1.15 - \$7.15)	(\$1.2 - \$7.14)	(\$1.01 - \$6.59)	(\$0.99 - \$6.65)	(\$0.98 - \$6.72)	(\$1 - \$5.17)	(\$0.99 - \$5.28)
Disruption Component	Mean	\$5.36	\$6.30	\$6.26	\$5.51	\$5.55	\$5.52	\$5.10	\$5.10
Total	Range	(\$2.43 - \$9.09)	(\$2.87 - \$10.31)	(\$3.03 - \$10.28)	(\$2.56 - \$9.07)	(\$2.46 - \$9.2)	(\$2.6 - \$9.3)	(\$2.35 - \$8.27)	(\$2.33 - \$8.44)
Total Costs	Mean	\$16.90	\$12.50	\$18.58	\$14.40	\$12.79	\$16.26	\$14.03	\$15.85
	Range	(\$7.37 - \$31.61)	(\$8.21 - \$17.43)	(\$8.3 - \$34.08)	(\$7.36 - \$22.68)	(\$6.99 - \$19.68)	(\$11.81 - \$21.19)	(\$7.22 - \$22.12)	(\$11.56 - \$20.81)
Total Premium in \$/Gal	Mean	\$0.40	\$0.30	\$0.44	\$0.34	\$0.30	\$0.39	\$0.33	\$0.38
<p>Variations</p> <p>0) Version Reported in Leiby/ORNL 2006 study, Table 1 (in \$2005). OPEC response treated parametrically, varying Elasticity 0.25 - 5.0. Net elast of supply to US: 3 - 15. Disruption probabilities from EMF 2005 Estimates. Oil market outlook from AEO2006 Base case.</p> <p>1) Based on AEO2007. Updated oil market outlook from AEO1994 Base Case to AEO2007 Base Case. Among other things, this means average crude price rises from \$20.33 to \$48.34. All elasticities match 1997 values. Non-US Elasticity of Import demand = -0.876, parametric treatment of OPEC response with elasticity 1.0-5.0 (triangular distribution with mode 2.0).</p> <p>2) AEO2007 Base Outlook, Wider range of OPEC Supply Elasticities, 0.25 to 6.0, Mean 1.8 (NOTE = RiskOmu(0.6,0.25,1.4),(0.1,0.5,0.9)))</p> <p>3) Updated (2) Supply/Demand elasticities non NonOPEC region with more recent estimates. Elasticity mode elasticity of Non-US Demand -0.2 to -0.4, with mean and mode -0.3, Non-US Supply = -0.2 to -0.4, with mean and mode 0.3, implying (mode) net elasticity of import demand from NonUS/NonOPEC regions ~doubled to -1.6.</p> <p>4) Alternative to Case (3) with expanded (and even higher) range of Non-US Supply/Demand elasticities. Elasticity Non-US Demand = -0.3 to -0.7, triangular dist with mode -0.4 mean -0.467, Elasticity of Non-US Supply = 0.2 to 0.6, mode 0.3 and mean 0.367. Implying (mode) net elasticity of import demand from NonUS/NonOPEC regions more than doubled to mode -1.92, mean -2.28.</p> <p>5) Applied Strategic OPEC Behavioral Rule to (4): Maintain Market Share (Gately 2005 paper robust strategy). This rule implies that OPEC Supply elasticity matches that of all Non-OPEC supply. As a result Non-US Elasticity of Import Demand ranges from 1.38 to 3.52, with mode 1.92. Total elasticity of Net import supply to US then ranges from 4.8 to 8.6 (90%CI).</p> <p>6) Variant on version Case (3), Considered Reduced GDP Elasticity for future disruptions (range -0.01 to -0.054, midcase value -0.032. Mean value is 0.032, reduced from mean value 0.0495). OPEC-behavior treated parametrically.</p> <p>7) Revise Case 5 (which applied Strategic OPEC Behavioral Rule to (4): Maintain Market Share (Gately 2005 paper robust strategy)) with Reduced GDP Elasticity for future disruptions (range -0.01 to -0.054, midcase value -0.032. Mean value is 0.032, reduced from mean value 0.0495).</p>									

Technical Appendix B - Calculation of Premium

Monopsony Premium:

$$\pi_{monops}(q_{iu}) = \frac{P_w(q_{iu})}{\eta_{is}} \quad (20)$$

Calculation of the elasticity of net import supply

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{monops} &= \frac{P_w}{\eta_i} \\ \eta_i &= \frac{\eta_{sO}q_{sO} - \eta_{iN}q_{iN}}{q_{iU}} \\ \Rightarrow \pi_{monops} &= \frac{P_w s_U}{\eta_{sO} - \eta_{iN}(1 - \sigma_U)} \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

Disruption Premium - total

$$\frac{\partial E_{\{\Delta Q\}}[C_{disr}]}{\partial q_{iu}} = \frac{\partial}{\partial q_{iu}} \sum_j \phi_j [C_{Idisr}(\Delta P(\Delta Q_j)) + C_{GNPdisr}(\Delta P(\Delta Q_j))] \quad (22)$$

Disruption Premium - Import Cost Component

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{Idisr}(q_{iu}) &\equiv \frac{\partial}{\partial q_{iu}} \sum_j \phi_j [q'_{iu} \Delta P(\Delta Q_j)] - \rho_E E[\Delta P] \\ &= \sum_j \left(\frac{\partial \phi_j}{\partial q_{iu}} \right) [q'_{iu} \Delta P(\Delta Q_j)] + \sum_j \phi_j \left[\frac{dq'_{iu}}{dq_{iu}} \Delta P(\Delta Q_j) (1 - \rho_E) + \sum_j \phi_j q'_{iu} \frac{\partial}{\partial q_{iu}} [\Delta P(\Delta Q_j)] \right] \\ &\equiv \pi_{Idisr-deterrence} + \pi_{Idisr-direct} + \pi_{Idisr-monopsony} \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

Note that the first sub-component, the deterrence portion of the Disruption Import Cost Component, can be written

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{Idisr-deterrence}(q_{iu}) &\equiv \sum_j \left(\frac{\partial \phi_j}{\partial q_{iu}} \right) [q'_{iu} \Delta P(\Delta Q_j)] \\ \sum_j \left(\frac{\partial \phi_j}{\partial q_{iu}} \right) \frac{q_{iu}}{\phi_j} \frac{q'_{iu}}{q_{iu}} \phi_j [\Delta P(\Delta Q_j)] &= \epsilon_{\phi, q_i} \frac{q'_{iu}}{q_{iu}} \sum_j \phi_j [\Delta P(\Delta Q_j)] \\ &= \epsilon_{\phi, q_i} \frac{q'_{iu}}{q_{iu}} E[\Delta P] \approx \epsilon_{\phi, q_i} E[\Delta P] \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

This gives some sense of the possible magnitude of that omitted term. If the elasticity of probability with respect to imports were to be, e.g. 1.0, then this term would be equal to the expected price increase. We assume $\epsilon_{\phi, q_i} = 0$.

Disruption Premium - elaboration of Disruption Monopsony Premium

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{Idisr-monopsony} &\equiv \sum_j \phi_j q'_{iu} \frac{\partial}{\partial q_{iu}} [\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})] \\ &= \sum_j \phi_j q'_{iu} \left[\frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial \Delta Q_j} \frac{\partial \Delta Q_j}{\partial q_{iu}} + \frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial q_{iu}} \right]\end{aligned}\quad (25)$$

For a linear treatment of disruption price change:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}) &= \beta_{\Delta P}(q_{iu}) \cdot \Delta Q_j \\ \sum_j \phi_j q'_{iu} \frac{\partial}{\partial q_{iu}} [\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})] &= \sum_j \phi_j q'_{iu} \left[\beta_{\Delta P}(q_{iu}) \frac{\partial \Delta Q_j}{\partial q_{iu}} + \frac{\partial \beta_{\Delta P}(q_{iu})}{\partial q_{iu}} \Delta Q_j \right]\end{aligned}\quad (26)$$

Disruption Premium - GDP Dislocation Cost Component

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{GDPdisr}(q_{iu}) &\equiv \frac{d}{dq_{iu}} \sum_j \phi_j \cdot \Delta GDP(\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}), q_{du}) \\ &= \sum_j \frac{\partial \phi_j}{\partial q_{iu}} \cdot \Delta GDP(\Delta P, q_{du}) + \sum_j \phi_j \frac{\partial \Delta GDP(\Delta P, q_{du})}{\partial q_{du}} \cdot \frac{dq_{du}}{dq_{iu}} \\ &\quad + \sum_j \phi_j \left[\frac{\partial \Delta GDP}{\partial \Delta P} \frac{d\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{dq_{iu}} \right]\end{aligned}\quad (27)$$

Using a linear approximation for the change in GDP with price, which is accurate given small elasticity of GDP with respect to oil shocks, ϵ_{yp} :

$$\Delta GDP(\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}), q_{du}) = \epsilon_{yp}(q_{du}) \frac{GDP}{P} \Delta P(Q_j, q_{iu}) \quad (28)$$

Substituting and taking derivatives

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi_{GDPdisr}(q_{iu}) &\equiv \frac{d}{dq_{iu}} \sum_j \phi_j \cdot \epsilon_{Yp}(q_{du}) \frac{GDP}{P} \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}) \\
&= \sum_j \frac{\partial \phi_j}{\partial q_{iu}} \cdot \epsilon_{Yp}(q_{du}) \frac{GDP}{P} \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}) \\
&\quad + \sum_j \phi_j \left(\frac{\partial \epsilon_{Yp}(q_{du})}{\partial q_{du}} \cdot \frac{dq_{du}}{dq_{iu}} \right) \frac{GDP}{P} \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}) \\
&\quad + \sum_j \phi_j \cdot \epsilon_{Yp}(q_{du}) \left(-\frac{GDP}{P^2} \frac{dP}{dq_{iu}} \right) \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}) \\
&\quad + \sum_j \phi_j \cdot \epsilon_{Yp}(q_{du}) \frac{GDP}{P} \left(\frac{d\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{dq_{iu}} \right)
\end{aligned} \tag{29}$$

Dropping the possible deterrence effect of pre-disruption import levels on ϕ_j and holding demand level q_{du} and GDP elasticity constant for this partial equilibrium analysis of import changes leaves only the last two terms.

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi_{GDPdisr}(q_{iu}) &\equiv \sum_j \phi_j \cdot \epsilon_{Yp}(q_{du}) \left(-\frac{GDP}{P^2} \frac{dP}{dq_{iu}} \right) \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}) \\
&\quad + \sum_j \phi_j \cdot \epsilon_{Yp}(q_{du}) \frac{GDP}{P} \left(\frac{d\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{dq_{iu}} \right)
\end{aligned} \tag{30}$$

Three channels remain for the pre-disruption import level to affect the disruption price level and GDP loss: through the base oil price, through disruption quantity and through the rate of price change with disruption quantity.

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi_{GDPdisr}(q_{iu}) &= \epsilon_{Yp} \left(-\frac{GDP}{P^2} \frac{dP}{dq_{iu}} \right) \sum_j \phi_j \cdot \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}) \\
&\quad + \epsilon_{Yp} \frac{GDP}{P} \sum_j \phi_j \left[\frac{\partial \Delta P}{\partial \Delta Q} \frac{\partial \Delta Q}{\partial q_{iu}} + \frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial q_{iu}} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{31}$$

Again, for a linear treatment of disruption price change:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu}) &= \beta_{\Delta P}(q_{iu}) \cdot \Delta Q_j \\
\pi_{GDPdisr}(q_{iu}) &= \epsilon_{yp} \left(-\frac{GDP}{P^2} \frac{dP}{dq_{iu}} \right) \sum_j \phi_j \cdot \beta_{\Delta P}(q_{iu}) \cdot \Delta Q_j \\
&+ \epsilon_{yp} \frac{GDP}{P} \sum_j \phi_j \left[\beta_{\Delta P}(q_{iu}) \frac{\partial \Delta Q_j}{\partial q_{iu}} + \frac{\partial \beta_{\Delta P}(q_{iu})}{\partial q_{iu}} \Delta Q_j \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{32}$$

Combining Terms

$$\pi_{tot}(q_{iu}) \equiv \pi_{monops}(q_{iu}) + \pi_{Idisr}(q_{iu}) + \pi_{GDPdisr}(q_{iu}) \tag{33}$$

substituting (without deterrence effect terms or terms related to the change in pre-disruption demand with pre-disruption import levels):

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi_{tot}(q_{iu}) &\equiv \frac{P_w(q_{iu})s_U}{\eta_{sO} - \eta_{iN}(1-\sigma_U)} \\
&+ \sum_j \phi_j \frac{dq_{iu}'}{dq_{iu}} [\Delta P(\Delta Q_j)] (1-\rho_E) \\
&+ q_{iu} \sum_j \phi_j \left[\frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial \Delta Q_j} \frac{\partial \Delta Q_j}{\partial q_{iu}} + \frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial q_{iu}} \right] \\
&- \epsilon_{yp} \frac{GDP}{P^2} \sum_j \phi_j \Delta P(Q_j, q_{iu}) \left[\frac{\partial P}{\partial q_{iu}} \right] \\
&+ \epsilon_{yp} \frac{GDP}{P} \sum_j \phi_j \left[\frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial \Delta Q} \frac{\partial \Delta Q}{\partial q_{iu}} + \frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial q_{iu}} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{34}$$

gathering terms

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi_{tot}(q_{iu}) &\equiv \frac{P_w(q_{iu})s_U}{\eta_{sO} - \eta_{iN}(1-\sigma_U)} \\
&+ \sum_j \phi_j [\Delta P(\Delta Q_j)] (1-\rho_E) \\
&+ \left(q_{iu} + \frac{\partial \Delta GDP}{\partial \Delta P} \right) \sum_j \phi_j \left[\frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial \Delta Q_j} \frac{\partial \Delta Q_j}{\partial q_{iu}} + \frac{\partial \Delta P(\Delta Q_j, q_{iu})}{\partial q_{iu}} \right]
\end{aligned} \tag{35}$$

Appendix C: Details on Calculation of Disruption Probabilities

Disruption probability distributions for four major supply regions were adopted from the EMF-2005 study, which focused on the 2005 to 2015 period. For each region, these distributions were specified for disruptions in terms of percentage loss of supply, typically for 0%, 20%, 50% and 90% losses. (See the following Figure and Table C1 below).

Short Duration (1-6 mo) Disruptions




Figure 5 EMF 2005 reported decadal, net disruption distributions by region, for short and long disruption lengths. Their implications for disruption sizes (based on an earlier AEO) are shown here, and were aggregated and summarized in this analysis. (Source: EMF/Beccue and Huntington, 2005).

The decadal probabilities were converted to annual probabilities and entered in a simple probabilistic simulation spreadsheet driven by @Risk. After combined simulation of annual disruptions with a sample size of 10,000, using the software @Risk, the following cumulative distribution for annual probabilities of world supply shortfalls (gross and net after excess capacity utilization) was obtained for the year 2010. This distribution was taken as generally representative of annual disruptions in the next decade.




Figure 6 Cumulative distribution for annual probabilities of world supply shortfalls (gross and net after excess capacity utilization) in the year 2010, after simulation for the separate regions.

This distribution of world supply net shortfalls was aggregated into probabilities for 4 discrete *net* disruption sizes, to match the size categories used in the 1997 ORNL analysis. The discrete net disruption sizes were: 0 MMBD (including 0.0-0.999 MMBD), 1 MMBD (including 1.0-3.999 MMBD), 4 MMBD (including 4.0-5.999 MMBD), and 6 MMBD (including 6.0 and larger). It is recognized that this simple aggregation into bins identified with the lower-bound-value leads to some understatement of the mean disruption sizes entailed by the EMF study. In fact, the expected disruption sizes for events within each of the four bins (size categories) are 0.1, 1.5, 4.7, and 10.0 MMBD, respectively. The annual disruption probabilities for each discrete size were converted into decadal disruption probabilities (for at least one disruption of that size category). That is, $\phi_{\text{decadal}} \equiv 1 - (1 - \phi_{\text{annual}})^{10}$. These decadal event probabilities (see Table C2) were used for the premium calculation meant to be representative over the period 2006-2015.

Table C1: EMF 2005 Disruption Probabilities

Primary Source: Energy Modeling Forum, Phillip C. Beccue and Hillard G. Huntington, 2005.

Saudi Arabia Probabilities

Saudi Arabia Disruption Length Probabilities

Length (Months)	3	12	18
Length Probability	54.0%	22.2%	23.7%

Saudi Arabia Disruption Size Probabilities

Size/Length	0.00%	20.00%	50.00%	90.00%	Total
3	93.38%	5.07%	1.15%	0.40%	100.00%
12	97.14%	1.95%	0.60%	0.32%	100.00%
18	98.58%	0.87%	0.31%	0.24%	100.00%

West of Suez Region Probabilities

West of Suez Disruption Length Probabilities

Length (Months)	3	12	18
Length Probability	37.6%	48.1%	14.3%

West of Suez Disruption Size Probabilities

Size/Length	0.00%	20.00%	50.00%	90.00%	Total
3	85.83%	11.90%	2.19%	0.07%	100.00%
12	92.61%	5.77%	1.55%	0.07%	100.00%
18	98.66%	0.89%	0.42%	0.03%	100.00%

Other Persian Gulf Region Probabilities

Other Persian Gulf Disruption Length Probabilities

Length (Months)	3	12	18
Length Probability	42.1%	30.2%	27.6%

Other Persian Gulf Disruption Size Probabilities

Size/Length	0.00%	20.00%	50.00%	90.00%	Total
3	79.87%	18.07%	1.84%	0.21%	100.00%
12	92.60%	5.96%	1.28%	0.16%	100.00%
18	97.02%	2.21%	0.67%	0.09%	100.00%

Russia and Caspian Region Probabilities

Russia and Caspian Region Disruption Length Probabilities

Length (Months)	3	12	18
Length Probability	89.5%	8.0%	2.5%

Russia and Caspian Region Disruption Size Probabilities

Length/Size	0.00%	20.00%	50.00%	90.00%	Total
3	97.08%	2.41%	0.51%	0.00%	100.00%
12	99.57%	0.33%	0.10%	0.00%	100.00%
18	99.87%	0.10%	0.03%	0.00%	100.00%

Work Source: "Oil64 decomposition ByPricePath shortlongvlong.xls", August 16, 2005. For lengths, see worksheet "oil64codedlengthsbyregion.xls", August 17, 2005.

Table C2: Discrete Disruption Probabilities Used in Disruption Premium Calculation				
Disruption Size (Thousand Bbl/d)	0	1000	3000	6000
Disruption Size (Million bbl/d)	0	1	3	6
Gross Disruption Cumulative Annual Probability	75.5%	75.5%	93.9%	95.4%
Net Disruptions Cumulative Annual Probability	77.1%	91.4%	94.2%	98.7%
Net Disruption Annual Discrete Probability	14.2%	2.9%	4.4%	1.4%
Net Disruption Decadal Discrete Probability	78.4%	25.3%	36.4%	12.7%

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