Includes bibliographical references.

Introduction -- 2001 attacks and cleanup -- Context of the study and charge to the Committee -- Content and structure -- Infectious disease threats -- Ability of microorganisms to infect people -- Infectious disease as a weapon -- Agents of concern to national security and public health -- Biological agents considered in this report -- Policy precedents in decontamination -- Microbial decontamination in food and water supplies -- Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories -- Environmental infection control in health care facilities -- Decontamination of U.S. Army Biological Warfare laboratories -- Development of Superfund and remediation plans -- Remediation experiences in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex -- Anthrax decontamination after the 2001 attacks: social and political context -- Uncertain science, certain social division -- Case study selection -- Framework for event management -- Hazard identification and assessment -- Identification of the agent -- Evaluating the state of the agent -- Evaluating the state of the contaminated building -- Factors influencing exposure to harmful biological agents in indoor environments -- Exposure -- Sources -- Building design and operations -- Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems -- Transport and fate of harmful biological agents -- Deposition -- Resuspension -- Preparing and operating buildings for a bioterrorism attack and subsequent operation -- Analyzing health risks -- Assessment of risks posed by a biological hazard -- Dose-response: principles and uncertainties -- Sampling strategies and technologies -- Sampling and identification -- General sampling plan for quantifying the extent of cleanup -- Decontamination practices and principles -- Processes for decontamination of harmful biological agents and other response options -- Decontamination of harmful biological agents by chemical and physical methods -- Examples of decontamination: Hart Senate Office Building and American Media International Building -- Safe reoccupation of a facility -- Planning for biological agent attack -- Buildings declared contaminated -- Harmful biological agents in a public facility: the airport scenario -- Planning can make a major difference -- All findings and recommendations -- Other relevant case studies -- Were the 2001 anthrax exposures consistent with dose-response: the case of the AMI building.