TY  - THES
A1  - Isik, H 
T1  - Joint liability group incentives and contracts for nonpoint source pollution.
Y1  - 2004//
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - THES
A1  - Pushkarskaya, H 
T1  - Nonpoint source water pollution control: incentives theory approach.
Y1  - 2003//
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - THES
A1  - Taylor, M 
T1  - Tradable permit markets for the control of point and nonpoint sources of water pollution: technology-based versus collective performance-based approaches.
Y1  - 2003//
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - JOUR
A1  - Taylor, M A
A1  - Sohngen, B L
A1  - Randall, A J
A1  - Pushkarskaya, H 
T1  - Group contracts for voluntary nonpoint source pollution reductions: evidence from experimental auctions.
Y1  - 2004//
N1  - R828627
JF  - AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
J1  - AM J AGR ECON
VL  - 86
IS  - 5
SP  - 1196
EP  - 1202
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Isik, H 
A1  - Sohngen, B 
T1  - Performance-based voluntary group contracts for nonpoint source pollution.
Y1  - 2003/07/
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Pushkarskaya, H 
A1  - Randall, A 
T1  - Transaction chain approach to the regulation of the nonpoint water pollution from farms’ runoff.
Y1  - 2002/07/
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Pushkarskaya, H 
A1  - Randall, A 
T1  - Toward a performance-based policy instrument for nonpoint source pollution control: an exercise in mechanism design.
Y1  - 2002/06/
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Pushkarskaya, H 
A1  - Arkes, H 
T1  - The spite effect and pseudo free-riding in dominant strategy mechanism with individual payments tied to collective performance and heterogeneous agents.
Y1  - 2004/11/
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Sohngen, B 
A1  - Taylor, M 
A1  - Isik, H 
A1  - Randall, A 
A1  - et, A L
T1  - An investigation into the potential to link voluntary incentive payments to water quality performance
Y1  - 2005//
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Taylor, M A
A1  - Sohngen, B L
A1  - Randall, A J
A1  - Pushkarskaya, H 
T1  - Group performance contracts for voluntary nonpoint source pollution control: evidence from experimental auctions.
Y1  - 2004/07/
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Taylor, M 
A1  - Pushkarskaya, H 
A1  - Sohngen, B 
A1  - Randall, A 
T1  - Group performance contracts for agricultural pollution abatement.
Y1  - 2003/12/
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Taylor, M 
A1  - Sohngen, B 
A1  - Randall, A 
T1  - A collective performance-based contract for point-nonpoint source pollution trading.
Y1  - 2003/02/
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Taylor, M 
A1  - Sohngen, B 
T1  - Group performance standards for agricultural pollution abatement.
Y1  - 2003/02/
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Taylor, M 
A1  - Randall, A 
A1  - Sohngen, B 
T1  - A collective performance contract for point-nonpoint source water quality trading.
Y1  - 2003/07/
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Taylor, M 
A1  - Sohngen, B 
A1  - Randall, A 
T1  - Point-nonpoint source pollution trading using collective performance incentives.
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Taylor, M 
A1  - Sohngen, B 
A1  - Isik, H 
A1  - Randall, A 
T1  - Testing group performance contracts for controlling agricultural pollution.
N1  - R828627
ER  - 


TY  - CONF
A1  - Randall, A 
T1  - Market-based instruments—international patterns of adoption, remaining challenges, and emerging approaches.
Y1  - 2004//
N1  - R828627
ER  -