TY - JOUR A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L A1 - Duke, A1 - C, T1 - A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. Y1 - 2003/11/ N1 - R829609 JF - JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT J1 - J ENVIRON ECON MANAG VL - 46 IS - 3 SP - 446 EP - 471 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - Auction design for voluntary conservation programs. Y1 - 2004/12/ N1 - R829609 JF - AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS J1 - AM J AGR ECON VL - 86 IS - 5 SP - 1211 EP - 1217 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - A laboratory comparison of uniform and discriminative price auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. Y1 - 2005// N1 - R829609 JF - LAND ECONOMICS J1 - LAND ECON VL - 81 IS - 1 SP - 51 EP - 70 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking. Y1 - 2006/10/ N1 - R829609 JF - JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION J1 - J ECON BEHAV ORGAN VL - 61 IS - 2 SP - 199 EP - 216 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - An experimental study of compliance and leverage in auditing and regulatory enforcement. Y1 - 2006// N1 - R829609 JF - ECONOMIC INQUIRY J1 - ECON INQ VL - 44 IS - 2 SP - 352 EP - 366 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L A1 - Duke, C T1 - A laboratory study of auctions for reducing nonpoint source pollution. Y1 - 2002/06/ N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - A laboratory comparison of uniform and discriminative price auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. Y1 - 2003/07/ N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - Auction design for voluntary conservation programs. Y1 - 2004/08/ N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking. Y1 - 2004/07/ N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking. Y1 - 2004/06/ N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - An experimental study of compliance and leverage in auditing and regulatory enforcement. Y1 - 2004/03/11 N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - An experimental study of compliance and leverage in auditing and regulatory enforcement. Y1 - 2004/03/12 N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - An experimental study of compliance and leverage in auditing and regulatory enforcement. Y1 - 2004/03/ N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking. Y1 - 2004/05/ N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - A laboratory comparison of uniform and discriminative price auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - A laboratory comparison of uniform and discriminative price auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - A laboratory comparison of uniform and discriminative price auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution. N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - A laboratory study of auctions for reducing nonpoint source pollution. N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N T1 - An experimental study of compliance and leverage in auditing and regulatory enforcement. N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking. N1 - R829609 ER - TY - CONF A1 - Cason, T N A1 - Gangadharan, L T1 - Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking. N1 - R829609 ER -