Design of Optimal Cost-Sharing Arrangements for Nonpoint Source Pollution ControlEPA Grant Number: U915395
Title: Design of Optimal Cost-Sharing Arrangements for Nonpoint Source Pollution Control
Investigators: Baerenklau, Kenneth A.
Institution: University of Wisconsin - Madison
EPA Project Officer: Edwards, Jason
Project Period: September 1, 1998 through August 1, 2001
Project Amount: $88,199
RFA: STAR Graduate Fellowships (1998) RFA Text | Recipients Lists
Research Category: Academic Fellowships , Economics and Decision Sciences , Fellowship - Economics and Business
The objectives of this research project are to: (1) apply a game-theoretic approach to the problem of developing optimal voluntary cost-sharing arrangements for controlling nonpoint source pollution; and (2) compare theoretically optimal policies derived under various conditions with empirical observations.
The first objective will be accomplished through original work in economic theory that will focus on developing an accurate theoretical model of the problems faced by regulators who are constrained both by limited funding and by exogenous environmental standards. The second objective will require gathering relevant data from public agencies and private landowners and developing an empirical model that includes the roles of uncertainty, information asymmetry, risk, and site heterogeneity. Until the appropriate economic theory is developed, it remains difficult to determine what types of statistical analyses will be used to evaluate Wisconsin's program.