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DIFFERENTIATING PASSENGER VEHICLES BY FUEL ECONOMY: STRATEGIC INCENTIVES AND THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADABLE CAFE STANDARDS
Impact/Purpose:
The regulation of fuel economy is one of the primary tools for controlling the emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants from passenger vehicles in the U.S., as well as for addressing energy security. This study will address an issue that has been overlooked in all previous studies of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and its alternatives: that imperfect competition can affect manufacturer incentives to deploy fuel-saving technologies. The resulting market failure can provide an important motivation for regulation, and it can change the relative cost-effectiveness of different market-based approaches, depending on their ability to target the underprovided market segments.
Description:
The welfare and distributional effects of alternative fuel economy regulations will be compared, including an increase in existing CAFE standards, allowing for tradable credits, and implementing other design options in a trading scheme, such as sliding standards based on vehicle size or other characteristics. In particular, we will look for novel approaches to a market mechanism that can also address the underprovision of fuel economy in certain market segments. Understanding the form and magnitude of the effects of this kind of market failure is essential to designing appropriate market-based mechanisms to address environmental problems related to fuel consumption. The methods can apply not only to fuel economy in passenger vehicles but also to energy efficiency in other goods like household appliances.